Continuous Burdens of Proof by Spottswood, Mark




CONTINUOUS BURDENS OF PROOF 
By Mark Spottswood* 
The burden of proof is an essential mechanism to ensure that cases are 
decided fairly. Our existing proof burdens, unfortunately, have a number of 
surprising downsides. Conventional burdens of proof are mathematically 
discontinuous. This means that a tiny shift in a jury’s confidence in guilt can lead 
to a dramatic change in consequences for the parties in a case. 
This Article explores the costs and benefits of an alternative approach to 
deciding cases, the continuous burden of proof, and concludes that adopting the 
right kind of continuous burden would help make our justice system fairer, more 
equitable, and more effective at deterring wrongdoing. Existing scholarship has 
analyzed one type of continuous burden of proof, the linear burden, which scales 
the amount of damages in direct proportion to a jury’s confidence level that the 
defendant has engaged in the charged offense. Unfortunately, the choice between 
linear continuous burdens and traditional burdens involves a hard-to-reconcile 
tradeoff between the values of deterring wrongdoing and reducing the expected 
rate of errors at trial. 
I offer two ways in which we might move beyond this apparent stalemate. 
First, I enumerate previously unexplored advantages of continuous burdens, 
including their ability to minimize the impacts of biases and other forms of 
structural unfairness at trial. Second, I offer the first exploration of the logistic 
continuous burden of proof. This novel means of deciding cases strikes a better 
balance between deterrence and expected errors than either a traditional burden 
or a linear continuous burden does. After making the case for the adoption of a 
logistic continuous burden of proof, this Article will consider some challenges that 
would stand in its way and some reasonable steps we could take towards the 
continuous approach. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................  780 
 I. CHOOSING BETWEEN A DISCONTINUOUS BURDEN AND A LINEAR 
BURDEN .............................................................................................  786 
 A. Deterrence .................................................................................  788 
 
*  David and Deborah Fonvielle Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I am 
enormously grateful to all those who have offered their thoughts on the ideas developed in this 
paper, including Ramona Albin, Kelli Alces, Shawn Bayern, Ed Cheng, Avlana Eisenberg, 
David Kaye, Jay Kesten, Steve Kolbert, Jake Linford, Wayne Logan, Sandy Mayson, Sarah 
Mirkin, Mike Morley, Emily Murphy, Dale Nance, Mike Pardo, Federico Picinali, Annibal 
Rosario-Lebron, Mark Seidenfeld, Justin Sevier, George Siedel, Julia Simon-Kerr, Sandy 
Gurera Thompson, Hannah Wiseman, Sam Wiseman, Maggie Wittlin, and Heather Wolfe. 
21 NEV. L.J. 779 
780 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
 B. Error Costs ................................................................................  792 
 II. CONSIDERING A BROADER SET OF FACTORS .....................................  796 
 A. Reducing the Average Magnitude of Legal Errors ....................  796 
 B. Treating Like Cases Alike ..........................................................  804 
 C. Disincentivizing Spoliation? ......................................................  808 
 III. DISSOLVING THE DILEMMA: THE LOGISTIC BURDEN OF PROOf ........  810 
 A. Understanding the Logistic Burden ...........................................  811 
 B. The Logistic Burden’s Benefits ..................................................  814 
 IV. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A CONTINUOUS BURDEN ............................  824 
 A. Implementation Challenges .......................................................  825 
 B. Areas Where Continuous Burdens May Meet Less Resistance ..  827 
 C. Areas Where Some of the Continuous Burden’s Benefits May 
Already Be Seen in Practice ......................................................  831 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................  833 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Our legal system implicitly commits itself to the notion that judges and juries 
can, and do, determine the factual truth in each case that reaches trial. Such an 
assumption is baked into the system’s nomenclature: we label juries as “fact-
finders” and use the same term for judges who perform a similar role during 
bench trials.1 This assumption is also implicit in the structure of conventional 
burdens of proof, which assign identical consequences to verdicts despite 
significant variation in the decision-maker’s confidence in guilt. Unfortunately, 
“fact-finding” is a bad metaphor for what juries do. “Fact-finding” suggests that 
deciding a dispute is like looking for your keys; you go through a process of 
investigation, which (hopefully) ends with your keys being located. Once your 
keys are found, you have no further need to worry that you might be wrong about 
their location. If deciding legal cases was a simple enough process that we could 
truly “find” facts in this sense, we would almost never have to worry that juries 
have awarded victory to the wrong party. 
Sadly, we do not live in such a simple world.2 A better understanding of 
what juries do leads to the conclusion that they are engaged in an inherently 
 
1  See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140–49 (2000) (using 
the terms “trier of fact” and “factfinder” interchangeably in reference to a trial jury). See 
generally Fact-Finder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (discussing the use of the 
term more generally in legal discourse). 
2  Cf. Kansas v. Marsh, II, 548 U.S. 163, 207–08 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, 
in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests”); BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 1–13 (2011) 
(describing the types of errors that gave rise to wrongful convictions, and noting that “similar 
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uncertain reconstruction of past events. They may be more or less confident 
about their conclusions, but they should always acknowledge the possibility that 
their judgments might be wrong. Our system, however, acknowledges this risk 
of error in a very crude fashion. If a civil jury is 51% convinced, we dish out 
identical consequences as if they were 99% convinced, even though the risk of 
error in the first case is vastly higher. Conversely, we treat cases involving 49% 
confidence in liability very differently from cases involving 51% confidence, 
even though the two states of information are much more similar. As we shall 
see, the artificial assignment of full blame once confidence surpasses 50% yields 
a number of troubling consequences. 
To avoid these problems, we could switch to a very different kind of proof 
rule: the continuous burden of proof.3 My goals in this Article are to survey the 
existing literature concerning this alternative, suggest some novel reasons why 
it may be superior to our present practices, and then suggest some smaller steps 
we can take to obtain some of its benefits without radically altering existing 
practice. 
To understand the notion of a continuous burden, it helps to first consider 
the structure of existing burdens of proof. As commonly understood, a burden of 
proof4 instructs the fact-finder to declare that one party’s case was true and the 
other’s false once a specified level of confidence has been reached regarding 
liability or guilt. The amount of confidence needed will vary depending on the 
subject matter, and it is usually defined in vague terms. These levels range from 
the low threshold of reasonable suspicion used for some investigative 
determinations,5 through the evenly balanced preponderance standard used to 
 
errors” in cases that did not involve DNA evidence “may have convicted countless other 
innocent people and led to the guilty going free”). 
3  Some previous articles have examined a particular type of continuous burden, which is linear 
in form, mostly focusing on the effects such burdens have on accuracy of outcomes and 
deterrence of wrongdoing. Cf. sources cited infra Section II.A and Part III. This Article, 
however, builds on these foundational efforts in a number of ways. First, I try to ground our 
use of discontinuous burdens in the history of our trial process, as a means of deflating 
intuitions which assume that any rule that is long-standing is likely to be wise. Second, I focus 
more heavily on the specific dysfunctions that occur due to the discontinuity of conventional 
burdens, where large variations in consequences occur across a narrow variation in fact-finder 
confidence. See generally infra Part II. Third, I consider the case of continuous burdens more 
generally, including a novel focus on the benefits of a continuous but non-linear liability 
function, the logistic burden of proof. See infra Part III.  
4  For accessibility, I use the phrase “burden of proof” throughout this introduction. More 
technically-minded readers will be aware that the burden of proof can be subdivided into 
burdens of persuasion (regarding the level at which a jury should be convinced before finding 
guilt or liability) and burdens of production (referring to the quantity of evidence needed 
before a court will allow a party to take a case to trial or ask a jury to render a verdict). See 2 
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 301:3 (8th ed.), Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2019). Absent a clear statement to the contrary, my references to 
burden of proof in main text should be taken to refer only to burdens of persuasion. 
5  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). 
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decide most civil cases,6 up to the stringent beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
required to obtain a criminal conviction.7 What is most important to observe for 
our present purposes is that these standards operate discontinuously, switching 
from no sanctions to full sanctions the moment that the specified level of 
confidence is reached. In other words, if the fact-finder’s confidence is just a bit 
below the threshold, the court will act as if the fact at issue is definitely false, at 
least for the purpose at hand.8 Once it crosses that threshold, the court will act as 
if the fact has been conclusively shown to be true and award a full victory to the 
party who bore the burden. In this respect, our typical burdens operate like a light 
switch with only two settings–on and off. 
A continuous burden of proof, by contrast, operates like a dimmer switch. 
As confidence increases in the likelihood of guilt or liability, the amount of 
damages or the length of incarceration increase gradually, starting from nothing 
and rising to the full measure of responsibility that the law can authorize.9 For 
instance, if we apply a continuous burden in a civil case, nothing dramatic 
happens when a jury’s confidence in liability increases from a 49% chance to a 
51% chance. Unlike the standard rule, which would suddenly shift from no 
damages to full damages given this miniscule shift, the continuous rule might 
increase the damages by only 2% of the full value.10 
Although this approach might seem strange and unfamiliar to those used to 
existing burdens of proof, it faithfully represents the fact that 49% confidence 
and 51% confidence are nearly identical states of information about the world. 
To be sure, if we are forced to choose, it makes sense to choose a threshold of 
50% in civil cases, as a means of minimizing our expected rate of error in a world 
 
6  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). 
7  Id. at 424. 
8  The only significant exception to this is judicial review of sufficiency of evidence, which 
can lead to some verdicts being set aside for being not just wrong, but unreasonable in light 
of the evidence presented. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50; FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. Relief under these 
rules represents the exception that proves the rule: within broad bounds of reasonableness, 
juries are entitled to have their say, and their decisions are treated as unimpeachably correct 
even if they rest on obviously uncertain grounds such as credibility judgments. 
9  This concept might seem similar to comparative fault rules in tort law, but there is a critical 
distinction. Comparative fault rules operate in tort cases where multiple parties collectively 
cause a single wrong to occur. Juries applying such rules are expected to engage in an all-or-
nothing assessment of what happened and then employ a sliding scale based on varying 
degrees of culpability to determine the share of damages each wrongdoer should pay. See 
generally Paul H. Edelman, What Are We Comparing in Comparative Negligence?, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 73, 76–80 (2007). Continuous proof burdens, by contrast, vary sanctions in all 
kinds of cases (not just cases involving joint tortfeasors), and vary sanctions based on 
variations in how convinced a jury is regarding the truth of a plaintiff’s claim. 
10  The above example uses a linear burden rule, with penalties increasing by a constant 
amount in proportion to a fact-finder’s credence, in order to simplify the initial explanation of 
the nature of a continuous burden. In practice, it may be desirable to use a non-linear 
transformation from credence to consequences. See generally discussion infra Parts II and III. 
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of limited information.11 But in the modern legal context, we have the capacity 
to fluidly vary many sanctions, so we no longer need to make an all-or-nothing 
decision.12 Damages awards, levied fines, and the length of prison sentences can 
be adjusted in response to varying levels of confidence, so there is no need to 
make a discontinuous choice between extreme options.13 
The existing literature makes it seem that the choice between these two 
burdens requires us to make a difficult choice with respect to the competing 
values of optimizing the deterrence of wrongdoing and minimizing the extent to 
which we punish innocent people.14 On the one hand, a number of scholars have 
illustrated the paradoxical effects that conventional burdens can create when acts 
spread a low risk of harm widely, or where an actor expects that their wrongdoing 
will be difficult to prove to a high level of confidence in court.15 Such acts will 
be severely under-deterred by the existing rule, while a continuous rule will tend 
to strike a better balance. On the flip side, David Kaye has demonstrated, using 
the tools of decision theory, that in some simple cases a discontinuous liability 
rule will produce lower expected error costs than any alternative rule we might 
adopt.16 In other words, if we scale punishment in proportion to proof, we will 
generally take more money from people who did nothing wrong, and less from 
culpable tortfeasors, as compared with the all-or-nothing rule. Since most of us 
care deeply about preventing wrongs from happening in the first place and 
accurately assigning blame when they do occur, this seems to present an 
irreconcilable stalemate. 
I offer two different lines of argument to help us move beyond this impasse, 
both of which favor a continuous burden of proof over the traditional approach. 
First, I will explore some underappreciated benefits of continuous burdens.17 
 
11  See Edward K. Cheng & Michael S. Pardo, Accuracy, Optimality and the Preponderance 
Standard, 14 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 193, 194–201 (2015). 
12  There are, of course, some remaining cases in which a dichotomous choice is truly 
necessary. One cannot order 0.5 deportations, for instance. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
13  See DENNIS V. LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 182–185 (2006) (urging that all-
or-nothing verdict decisions are inherently problematic since guilt is always uncertain). 
14  See infra Part I. 
15  See, e.g., Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 857–59 
(2012) (discussing under-deterrence in criminal cases); Henrik Lando, The Size of the Sanction 
Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence, 1 REV. L. & ECONS. 277, 281–83 (2005) (same); 
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 115–17 (1987) (discussing over- 
and under-deterrence in civil tort cases); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass 
Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 861–67 
(1984) (same). 
16  See generally David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: 
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. 
J. 487, 494–503 (1982). Kaye focuses on expected error costs, which are determined based on 
the jury’s level of confidence in guilt or liability, rather than the actual costs of error produced 
by the system, because true error costs depend on the distribution of merit across disputed 
cases, which is extremely difficult to measure or optimize. See David H. Kaye, Two Theories 
of the Civil Burden of Persuasion, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 9, 9–10 (2003). 
17  See infra Part II. 
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One additional benefit of continuous burdens is their ability to spread the risk of 
error across both parties in case. Because we only assign full liability or 
punishment in cases where we are nearly certain that the charged wrong has been 
committed, we expect to make far fewer very large errors, such as bankrupting a 
civil defendant or executing a criminal defendant.18 Moreover, although some 
large errors will still occur, they will be reserved for cases in which guilt or 
innocence seemed to be nearly certain to the fact-finder, which feels less unjust 
than imposing a large risk of error on one party in a case that was close to a toss-
up. 
Continuous burdens also avoid the drastic difference that occurs when a jury 
is nudged across the line that separates guilt and innocence under a conventional 
burden. Since parties mostly take hard cases to trial, juries will have to make 
many close calls. Sadly, there are a number of ways that parties can obtain unfair 
advantages at trial. Some defendants may fall victim to a racial bias on the part 
of jury members,19 while others may find that their opponents can afford much 
more effective trial counsel.20 These kinds of unfortunate influences are greatly 
magnified by a system that makes the difference between 51% confidence and 
49% confidence the difference between full damages and no award at all. The 
continuous burden, by contrast, does not eliminate these influences, but it does 
greatly shrink their impact. Similarly, continuous burdens offer a more 
speculative benefit, which is their potential to reduce the incentives parties 
currently have to hide or destroy evidence. This benefit arises through the same 
mechanism: just as there is less to gain from having a better attorney in a close 
case, similarly there is less to gain by subtracting one piece of evidence from the 
jury’s consideration. 
I will also offer a second line of argument by devising a novel form of 
continuous proof burdens with particularly beneficial properties.21 Existing work 
in this space has focused its attention solely on a linear burden when analyzing 
the costs and benefits of a continuous burden of proof, but other functional forms 
may be superior to both. I analyze one interesting alternative: a continuous 
 
18  This idea was briefly explored in the civil context, but subsequent work on burdens of proof 
has not developed it more fully. See Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating 
the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1165–68 (1983). 
19  See, e.g., Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868–71 (2017) (recounting some of 
the dark history of racial bias in American courtrooms and holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause required States to permit inquiries when encountering evidence of racially biased 
jurors); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987) (summarizing a study by Baldus 
et al. on the troubling influences of defendant and victim race on capital sentencing outcomes 
in Georgia). 
20  Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, Examining the Case for Socialized Law, 129 YALE L.J. 
2078, 2089 (2020) (reviewing FREDERICK WILMOT-SMITH, EQUAL JUSTICE: FAIR LEGAL 
SYSTEMS IN AN UNFAIR WORLD (2019)) (“[W]ealthy individuals are attended to by creative 
and well-resourced counsel, whose efforts plainly translate into vastly superior outcomes.”). 
21  See infra Part III. 
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burden of proof which takes the form of a logistic function,22 mapping 
confidence levels onto damages amounts in a smooth but non-linear way. 
Logistic burdens can be designed with parameters that make them closely 
approximate either the traditional or the linear burden, but they can also be given 
a shape that is intermediate between the two extremes. This flexibility allows us 
to strike a balance between competing goals such as deterrence and reducing 
error rates, instead of optimizing one value at the expense of getting the worst 
outcome with respect to the other. Moreover, if we implemented a logistic 
burden of proof with the right parameters, we should make fewer large errors 
relative to what is expected under either the traditional rule or the more 
commonly discussed linear alternative. 
The remainder of the paper will consider issues of implementation.23 Of 
course, in some areas, existing laws and practices may make it very hard to 
implement a continuous burden of proof. Most notably, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right not 
to be convicted unless their guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, which 
would make it difficult to implement a fully continuous burden in criminal 
cases.24 Nonetheless, there may be fewer obstacles in other contexts. Many 
decision-makers have large discretion over their mode of operation, with few 
constitutional or statutory constraints.25 Thus, it may be easier to implement 
continuous burdens in the context of internal corporate fact-finding, agency 
decision-making or arbitration. Some areas of law, such as tort law and capital 
sentencing, have already taken steps towards continuous burdens, and the 
arguments I will develop below suggest that such efforts should be defended and 
extended.26  Likewise, some features of the trial process, such as civil 
settlements, may roughly approximate the outcomes that a continuous burden 
would produce, so the analysis in this Article provides a reason to view the rise 
of settlements (and the corresponding decline of trials) a bit more favorably. 
 
22  Logistic burdens take the following functional form, using three scaling constants, r, C1 







The result is a sort of flattened S-shape, which rises slowly starting at a jury confidence level 
of 0, more quickly around 0.5, and then more slowly again as the jury’s confidence approaches 
1. As I shall discuss in Part III, neither the judge nor jury need manipulate this equation directly 
in order for us to implement a logistic burden of persuasion; instead, a rule-maker can set the 
appropriate parameters for the equation and then produce a table that translates confidence 
levels into appropriate percentages of damages. 
23  See infra Part IV. 
24  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See generally discussion infra Section IV.A. 
25  See infra Section IV.B. 
26  See infra Section IV.C. 
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I. CHOOSING BETWEEN A DISCONTINUOUS BURDEN AND A LINEAR BURDEN 
This part will summarize the main debates concerning the utility of either 
the traditional, discontinuous burden, and the alternative linear burden of proof 
rule. Before we begin, it may help to more clearly define each burden. At a 
fundamental level, burdens of persuasion are functions27 that take the level of 
confidence that a jury has in guilt or liability as inputs and then assign varying 
levels of sanctions as outputs. To make comparisons easy, it helps to express the 
burdens graphically, with the amount of damages awarded on the y-axis and the 
jury’s confidence in liability on the x-axis. Using the language of probability 
theory, we will describe a jury that is certain of innocence at a level of 0. A jury 
that believes that guilt or innocence are equally likely have a confidence level of 
0.5, and a jury that is certain of guilt has a confidence of 1. 
Plotted in this fashion, conventional burdens take the form of a step-
function, which assigns no liability from a confidence level of 0 up to a level of 
0.5 and then assigns full damages from the point just above 0.5 up to 1. Such 
burdens are discontinuous in the mathematical sense, because they leap abruptly 
from one value to another value, rather than varying smoothly across their entire 
range. 
If we label the jury’s confidence level in liability or guilt as p and the 
determined damages in the case as D, the rule can be expressed using the 
following equations: 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 = 0,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 0.5 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 = 𝐷,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	0.5 < 𝑝	, ≤ 1 
And when plotted, the discontinuous rule appears as the dashed line in the 
following graph, with the “jump” illustrated by the vertical line at the level of 
0.5 jury confidence in liability28: 
  
 
27  Although judges typically instruct juries that the burden applies to the amount of damages 
as well, they typically have not articulated a method by which to do this. Damages, of course, 
can vary smoothly across a wide range of dollar values, so that any particular value may have 
a negligible likelihood of being correct. To the extent that they consider these complications, 
judges typically instruct the jury to award the mean of a range of possible damages, even 
though this may not lead to an award of damages that is more likely than not to be greater than 
or equal to the actual harm suffered by a plaintiff. For a thoughtful exposition of these issues, 
see Omer Y. Pelled, All-or-Nothing, or Something—Proportional Liability in Private Law, 22 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 158 (2021). For present purposes, I will assume (as most analysts 
do) that the two burdens are being applied to the non-damages elements, relative to a fixed 
total damages value that the jury will determine using a separate rule. 
28  We could similarly express the criminal burden of proof, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” 
subject to uncertainty regarding the level of probability implied by that vague formulation. 
See LINDLEY, supra note 13, at 184; Discussion infra note 85 (collecting and discussing prior 
literature concerning the level of probability that matches the criminal burden of persuasion 
standard). 
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The main foil for this conventional burden in the literature has been a linear 
burden of proof, which has also been referred to as a proportional liability rule.29 
Such a burden awards damages in proportion to the jury’s level of confidence, 
so that as the confidence goes up, the fraction of damages increases as well. This 
sort of burden is continuous, in that it exhibits no jumps, instead increasing 
monotonically from 0 to 1. As an equation, it takes the following simple form: 
𝐴𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 = 𝑝𝐷  
When graphed, the linear burden appears as a simple line with no jumps 




29  See infra Sections I.A, I.B, II.A. 
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With these two kinds of proof burdens clearly in mind, let us now consider 
the existing debates concerning which is a better fit for our trial process. 
A. Deterrence 
It is widely agreed that a central benefit of imposing civil damages or 
criminal punishment is the deterrence of wrongdoing.30 Unfortunately, scholars 
and courts have identified a number of ways in which discontinuous burdens of 
proof fail to optimize this deterrence function.31 In cases where an actor can 
 
30  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 773 (9th ed. 2014); SHAVELL, 
supra note 15, at 298. 
31  A recent paper in the law and economics tradition has sought to resolve this problem via 
step-function burden of proof rules with highly variable thresholds, in order to account for the 
need to better calibrate deterrence. See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 
857–59 (2012). In addition to having some of the defects of step-function rules in general, 
which are discussed infra Sections I.B–D, this idea of variable discontinuous thresholds has 
further problems. In particular, such an approach makes highly unrealistic knowledge 
demands for the official who is responsible for adjusting the burdens; their unpredictable 
standards may be unfair to defendants who cannot predict the standards they will face in 
advance of trial, and they may struggle to obtain public legitimacy. See generally Cheng & 
Pardo, supra note 11, at 194–201. By contrast, the continuous burden does not vary case-to-
case, so it is less likely to suffer from these problems. Although one might imagine desiring a 
great deal of information in order to devise a continuous burden that optimally balances 
deterrence and error cost considerations, see infra Part III, one need not perfect such a balance 
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foresee that future cases will likely fail to exceed the proof threshold, the 
discontinuous rule will generally give little or no deterrence against 
wrongdoing.32 Conversely, in cases where guilt is probable but not certain, the 
dichotomous rule will tend to provide excessive deterrence and thereby 
discourage economically valuable activity.33 And these concerns may be 
magnified to the extent that potential wrongdoers are unduly optimistic risk-
seekers who hope to gamble on the prospect of total exoneration, while being 
relatively insensitive to the potential costs of longer sentences if they are 
probabilistically uncertain to be imposed.34 
Consider first the category of cases in which a party might cause some harm 
while knowing that it will be difficult for a victim to prove a case beyond the 
applicable threshold of proof. Such cases can take many forms. Perhaps the most 
discussed in the literature arises in the field of “toxic torts,” in which a plaintiff 
alleges that they have fallen ill due to exposure to one of the defendant’s 
products.35 In these cases, uncertainty can arise when similar products are sold 
under generic branding to consumers by many companies, with long latent 
periods before any symptoms might arise, leading to great uncertainty about 
which company caused harm to any particular plaintiff. Under such conditions, 
a seller who knew they sold harmful products to less than half the market might 
act with impunity, knowing how hard it would be for future plaintiffs to hold 
them accountable. For this reason, some courts have experimented with 
probabilistically adjusted recovery of damages in such cases.36 But potential 
problems of this kind occur in related contexts that the courts have not yet 
addressed. Uncertainty about causation also arises when a substance raises the 
likelihood of some illness which has multiple known causes. For instance, a 
company might sell a drug that modestly raises the risk of contracting a disease 
that can also arise from other causes. If we assume that 50 of the company’s 
customers would already have developed that illness, and now 25 more develop 
it as well, it would seem likely that 25 of them only became sick due to taking 
the drug. But unless different causes of disease leave some detectible biological 
marker behind, there may be no way to tell which person is which, with the result 
 
for it to be better than the alternative, adopting a rule that maximizes one quantity at the other’s 
expense. Moreover, many of the benefits reviewed in the later parts of this section do not 
require such information to be obtainable. 
32  See SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 115. 
33  Id. 
34  Fisher, supra note 15, at 857–59. 
35  See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 15, at 115; David Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 856–58. 
36  See Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908, 916 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Matsuyama 
v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 827–28 (Mass. 2008) (allowing proportional recovery for an 
illness based on the probability it was caused by an exposure, and surveying other cases taking 
a similar approach); Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys., 607 P.2d 924, 937–938 (Cal. 1980) (market 
share liability); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984). 
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that every potential plaintiff will lose if they sue.37 Thus, requiring all-or-nothing 
proof does nothing to deter some conduct even though it will predictably cause 
very serious harm. 
Nor is this problem confined to civil cases involving toxic exposures. Other 
types of civil cases, such as employment discrimination claims, may require a 
plaintiff to show that admitted actions were taken with improper intent.38 So long 
as there are other plausible reasons for firing someone, a supervisor might act for 
discriminatory reasons while remaining fairly confident that the plaintiff will be 
unable to prove the wrongdoing in court, due to the absence of a paper trail 
indicating the improper motivations.39 In criminal law, cases of acquaintance 
rape regularly fail due to the lack of witnesses other than the victim and the 
defendant.40 In such cases, it will often be possible for the defendant to claim that 
a sexual encounter was consensual. Even if the jury thinks the victim’s story 
more likely, they may balk at concluding that the defendant’s competing account 
does not create reasonable doubt.41 Homicide cases may present similar 
problems when the defendant can argue that he acted in self-defense or that the 
victim committed suicide.42 Given the high standard of proof, criminals may 
often calculate that they can get away with serious crimes, even though they can 
be connected to the crime scene by physical evidence or motive, so long as the 
victim cannot testify or their account cannot be corroborated. 
Now consider how a continuous burden of proof alters the incentives in all 
these scenarios. In the toxic exposure cases, the problem is that a predictable 
percentage of the company’s customers are being harmed, but any individual 
customer who falls ill cannot say that it was probably the company’s fault. But 
with a proportional rule (assuming the other elements are conceded or proven to 
a very high probability), a company who caused 1 out of 3 of the resulting cases 
of illness would pay each plaintiff 33% of their damages, which correctly prices 
the harm the company caused. Thus, the perverse incentive created by a 
dichotomous burden disappears. Similarly, a company that causes two out of 
 
37  See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 n.13 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that one must expect “unjust results” in applying the discontinuous burden to cases in 
which causation of disease must be proved statistically, whenever a substance increases a risk 
but does not double it). 
38  Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to Unconscious 
Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L. REV. 83, 
86–88 (2008). 
39  See id. at 96. 
40  Jason Wool, Note, Maintaining the Presumption of Innocence in Date Rape Trials Through 
the Use of Language Orders: State v. Safi and the Banning of the Word “Rape,” 15 WM. & 
MARY 193, 196–97 (2008).  
41  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility 
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2017) (noting the uphill battle that rape victims face in 
obtaining criminal convictions when their cases hinge on a credibility contest). 
42  See, e.g., Jensen v. Clements, 800 F.3d 892, 898, 906–08 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing the 
difficulties in assessing the comparative strength of prosecution and defense evidence in a 
murder case where the defense claimed the alleged victim died by her own hand). 
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three cases of illness pays each plaintiff 67% of their damages, rather than 100%, 
and thus we avoid over-punishing the company. Similarly, a party will be less 
confident that they can get away with wrongdoing due to a shortage of evidence. 
The supervisor who dismisses an employee on the basis of race cannot get off 
scot-free just by suggesting another plausible reason; rather, they must 
demonstrate that the other reason is substantially more plausible than the 
improper motivation, or the company will end up paying a significant partial 
damages award. Likewise, the homicide and rape cases described above are 
much less likely to result in a full acquittal; rather, the defendants can expect at 
least some punishment if their self-serving denials are not enough to convince 
fact-finders that they are probably innocent (even though they would raise a 
“reasonable” doubt). 
At this point, no doubt, some readers are silently objecting that some of these 
additional defendants must be innocent. And indeed, an honest assessment of a 
continuous burden of proof must acknowledge that it will likely produce an 
increase in error costs. This issue will be considered more fully in Part III, where 
I will discuss the need for striking an appropriate trade-off between deterrence 
and error, rather than simply optimizing one at the expense of the other. But 
before we leave deterrence behind, we should examine one more way that a 
continuous burden can improve our ability to deter wrongdoing. 
The above analysis applies most clearly if wrongdoers can easily predict the 
likely strength of the evidence that will be presented against them in the future. 
This may sometimes be the case, but we might also expect some offenders to act 
carelessly without thinking things through so clearly. Talia Fisher analyzed the 
expected deterrence benefit of a continuous burden on ordinary criminal 
offenders in some detail.43 In her analysis, she noted that potential offenders may 
expect a diminishing marginal cost for each year of imprisonment as sentences 
grow longer, which implies that the deterrence gain from the first year of a penal 
sentence is substantially larger than the gain from each additional year.44 They 
may also steeply discount their future utility, giving strong priority to the “here-
and-now” without much regard for what might happen to them decades down 
the line.45 These speculations find support in the empirical literature on crime 
and deterrence. At one extreme, innovations focused on raising the probability 
that offenders will be apprehended and given even a small punishment seem to 
have large deterrent effects on wrongdoing.46 By contrast, interventions that 
 
43  Fisher, supra note 15, at 857–59. 
44  Id. at 857; see also Doron Teichman, Convicting with Reasonable Doubt: An Evidentiary 
Theory of Criminal Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 757, 776 (2018); Gary S. Becker, Crime 
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 207–08 (1968). 
45  Fisher, supra note 15, at 857–59; Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying 
Criminals’ Risk Preferences, 91 IND. L.J. 791, 806–09 (2016). 
46  Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 227–28 
(2013) (reviewing studies showing the efficacy of such interventions). 
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focus on increasing the severity of sentences have smaller and less consistent 
effects.47 
Thus, the theoretical notion that we can trade-off a low probability of 
achieving convictions by raising sentences in that subset of cases without a cost 
to deterrence seems a poor fit for the real world. Instead, potential criminals may 
see little difference between a low chance of serving a ten-year versus a twenty-
year sentence, while being significantly more deterred by smaller sanctions that 
are more certain to occur. If that is right, then the continuous burden yields even 
more benefits, because it significantly increases the likelihood of some 
punishment, while reducing the typical length of sentences.48 Thus, both for 
those who can accurately predict the likely course of their trials, and for those 
who act recklessly with little regard for the future, the continuous burden of proof 
may provide a stronger deterrent than our existing approach to proving guilt and 
liability. 
B. Error Costs 
Most people do not care only about deterring wrongdoing at all costs; they 
also care about doing justice in individual cases. In a seminal paper, David Kaye 
showed that if we measure error costs in terms of the amount of dollars that are 
either wrongfully awarded to an undeserving plaintiff or withheld from a 
deserving plaintiff, then we should generally expect a higher quantity of error 
using a linear continuous burden.49 Kaye’s analysis focuses on a hypothetical 
civil case where we value an error in favor of either party equally.50 In its basic 
form, it addresses a case with a single plaintiff and a single defendant.51 Under 
our existing discontinuous liability rule, the defendant will either pay full 
damages D or zero damages. If a deserving plaintiff receives no damages, that 
reflects an error of magnitude D, just as it would if a defendant who did nothing 
wrong pays the damages in full. Now assume that the jury has estimated some 
 
47  See, e.g., Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the 
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 28–29 (2017) (reviewing literature on capital punishment, and 
showing that the highest quality studies generally fail to find evidence that it provides 
increased deterrence of crime). Given that death sentences are imposed with extreme rarity, 
even in the subset of cases where prosecutors initially seek them, see Nagin, supra note 46, at 
218, such findings suggest that potential offenders readily discount low probabilities of even 
extremely severe sanctions when deciding whether to commit crimes. 
48  These assumptions about defendants’ risk preferences and future discounting also imply 
that prosecutors should be able to encourage more defendants to plead guilty in a world in 
which we expect more convictions, even if those convictions are generally for shorter 
sentences. Thus, the deterrent effects of a continuous burden may be magnified from what one 
might expect based only on the small share of cases that reach trial. 
49  See generally Kaye, supra note 16, at 494–503. 
50  Id. at 496–97. 
51  Id. at 497. 
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probability p that the defendant is actually liable. If we use the standard approach 
to determining liability, then the expected errors (E) are as follows52: 
𝐸	 = 	𝑝𝐷, {0 ≤ 	𝑝 ≤ 	0.5} 
𝐸	 = 	 (1 − 𝑝)𝐷, {0.5	 < 	𝑝 ≤ 	1} 
This arises because, when p is less than or equal to 0.5, no damages will be 
awarded. Since the probability that the plaintiff’s claim is actually true in such 
cases is p, then for each case in that range, the expected error is p multiplied by 
D. For instance, if there is a 25% chance that the defendant wronged the plaintiff, 
but we award zero damages, then in 1 out of 4 cases, a plaintiff who deserves to 
receive D gets nothing. Therefore, we expect an average error of .25*D in such 
cases. Alternatively, we can consider the case where p is greater than 0.5, which 
leads to the defendant paying full damages under the current rule. The likelihood 
that these cases would be decided erroneously is 1-p, giving an expected error of 
1-p multiplied by D (the full damages paid by the defendant). Ergo, in the case 
where there is a 75% likelihood that the defendant wronged the plaintiff, 1 in 4 
defendants (which is .25, or 1 - .75) are actually innocent of wrongdoing, but 
they pay D anyway, which yields an expected error of .25*D again. If we graph 
this across the full range of p, with the x-axis representing p and the y-axis 




52  Id. at 498. 
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Kaye then considered the alternative of assigning liability as a linear 
function of the estimated likelihood of guilt, which has been recommended by 
many commentators as a means of ensuring optimal deterrence.53 For ease of 
understanding, it helps to first consider the expected errors that might be incurred 
by the parties separately. The plaintiff will be given the total damages, D, 
multiplied by p, the estimated likelihood that the defendant is actually liable for 
the claim. Each time these damages are paid, there is a 1-p chance that the 
defendant is innocent of the alleged wrongdoing, and the size of the error is the 
whole payment to the plaintiff, pD. Multiplying the probability of error by its 
size gives the expected error: 
	𝐸!(𝑝) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑝𝐷 
Conversely, each time that pD damages are paid, there is a p probability that 
the defendant did commit the alleged misconduct. Therefore, there is also an 
error favoring the defendant, because ideally the plaintiff should have received 
the full value of D every time they were wronged. The magnitude of such errors 
is the remaining portion of D that was not paid, D-pD, which can be simplified 
as (1-p)D. And because the probability that the defendant is actually liable is 
simply p, the overall expected magnitude of these errors is as follows: 
𝐸"(𝑝) = 	𝑝(1 − 𝑝)𝐷 
The overall expected error is simply the sum of the errors that would favor 
either party54: 
𝐸#$#%&(𝑝) = 2𝐷(𝑝 − 𝑝") 
Plotting this error function alongside the previous one reveals a surprising 
implication: 
 
53  See supra Section I.A and accompanying footnotes. 
54  This equation can be derived from the individual error terms, as shown below. Alert readers 
will have noticed that the separate error terms, E1(p) and E2(p), are equal to each other, greatly 
simplifying the analysis: 
𝐸)*)+,(𝑝) = 𝐸!(𝑝) + 𝐸'(𝑝) 
𝐸)*)+,(𝑝) = (1	– 	𝑝)𝑝𝐷	 + 	𝑝(1	– 	𝑝)𝐷 
𝐸)*)+,(𝑝) = 2𝑝(1	– 	𝑝)𝐷 
𝐸)*)+,(𝑝) = 2𝐷(𝑝 − 𝑝') 
 
21 NEV. L.J. 779 
Spring 2021] CONTINUOUS BURDENS OF PROOF 795 
 
As can be seen, the two rules have identical expected errors at three points: 
where the probability of liability is 0, 0.5, or 1. At all other points, we expect a 
somewhat greater error from the linear rule, due to the combined magnitude of 
smaller errors that affect either party,55 with an average expected error over the 
whole range of probabilities of .25 of the damages for the discontinuous rule and 
0.33 for the linear rule.56 Based in part on this analysis, Kaye concludes that, if 
we wish to minimize expected error costs in civil cases (given the above 
assumptions), the traditional discontinuous rule will best serve this purpose.57 
 
55  Kaye, supra note 16, at 499–500. 
56  This can be derived as follows. The average error of the discontinuous function is simply 
half its peak value of 0.5D, or 0.25D. For the average expected error of the linear continuous 
burden, one must integrate it over the range from 0-1: 




𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 	 [𝑝'𝐷 −
2
3𝑝
.𝐷	]	𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚	p = 0	𝑡𝑜	p = 1 





Therefore, the average increase in expected error when moving from the discontinuous to the 
linear continuous rule is a rise from 0.25 to 0.33A, or an overall increase of 0.0833A,  
57  His analysis goes further than just these two rules, and in fact includes a proof that the step 
function rule reduces errors better than any other means of transforming likelihood judgments 
into quantified proportions of damages. See Kaye, supra note 16, at 499–500 n.42. 
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II. CONSIDERING A BROADER SET OF FACTORS 
The discussion so far might have us think that the choice of a burden of proof 
rule is an intractable problem. It seems obvious enough that remedying past 
wrongs and deterring new ones are both important goals, which makes it very 
hard to make an all-or-nothing decision between the two alternatives.58 One way 
out of this dilemma would be to find additional considerations that make the 
choice a clearer one. In this part, I survey a few additional policy goals that have 
received far less attention but are inarguably relevant to any policy maker who 
must choose a burden of proof rule. As we shall see, continuous burdens have 
some additional advantages that the analysis so far has left out: First, they spread 
the risk of error more evenly across the parties and are therefore better at 
avoiding the imposition of particularly large errors on individual parties. Second, 
they reduce the impacts of various biases and unfair advantageous in the trial 
process. Lastly and most speculatively, they may also decrease incentives that 
parties currently have to hide or destroy evidence.59 
A. Reducing the Average Magnitude of Legal Errors 
One way to resolve the apparent impasse between deterrence and error-
minimization arguments is to consider, not just the absolute quantity of error, but 
the size of errors that are inflicted on each party separately. When we attend to 
the risk of error that each party will experience, we find that the current rule in 
fact concentrates its error risk on a single party, while the continuous burden 
would spread errors more fairly. This has two implications for our choice 
between the two burdens discussed so far. First, the absolute size of errors 
inflicted by the discontinuous burden will be larger, and second, the risk of error 
that parties experience will be shared less evenly under that rule. As a result, we 
might find that the error minimization criterion provides weaker support for the 
existing rule than we might otherwise have assumed. 
This point was first noted by Neil Orloff and Jerry Stedlinger, who extended 
Kaye’s analysis by briefly considering how the two rules compared in terms of 
their ability to avoid inflicting particularly large errors on individual parties.60 
To see the way that the two rules differ in terms of error magnitudes, consider a 
simple example in which a jury finds a civil defendant to be 51% likely to be 
 
58  See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1813, 1819–23 (1997) (arguing that tort theorists 
should follow the lead of criminal law scholars, who simultaneously value the twin goals of 
deterring new wrongs and righting existing ones). 
59  One additional policy criterion that many readers may care about is the impact of either rule 
on the rate of settlements versus tried cases. This paper cannot include a full analysis of this 
criterion due to space constraints, but in other work I have offered evidence that continuous 
burdens may modestly increase the incentive of parties to settle cases, and also increase the 
expected accuracy of settlements on average. See generally Mark Spottswood, Proof 
Discontinuities and Civil Settlements, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 201 (2021). 
60  See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 18, at 1165–68. 
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liable. The existing rule pays the plaintiff her full damages, D. By assumption, 
we should expect to be wrong in such cases 49% of the time. Thus, the expected 
error in such a circumstance is .49*D,61 and in all cases, it is only the defendant 
who expects to bear it. 
Now consider what happens under the linear rule. In such a system, the 
plaintiff should recover 51% of her damages at this level of proof. There is thus 
a 49% chance that this payment is wrongful because the defendant is innocent, 
as well as a 51% chance that this payment is inadequate by 49% of the damages 
because the defendant is in fact guilty. The expected absolute errors are therefore 
.49*.51 D (or approximately .25D) against the defendant plus .51*.49D (the 
same .25D) against the plaintiff. The discontinuous rule, in short, concentrates 
an especially large quantity of expected error entirely on the losing party in close 
cases, while the linear rule spreads the risk of error across both parties.62 
Kaye’s analysis would conclude that, since the sum of these expected errors, 
0.5D, is greater than .49D, the conventional burden is superior.63 But for a variety 
of reasons, we might think spreading errors is the better policy. First, as Orloff 
and Stedlinger noted, large errors are “more jolting to a sense of fairness” than 
smaller errors.64 Additionally, people typically do not weigh losses linearly; we 
are particularly concerned to avoid very large losses, while being more willing 
to tolerate greater risks of smaller ones.65 As a result, Orloff and Stedlinger 
suggested an alternative metric that penalizes a system for imposing large risks 
of losses on individual parties: the squared-error test.66 
Under the squared-error test, we square the expected risk of error to each 
party before adding them together. Such tests are common statistical devices 
used whenever larger errors seem particularly problematic.67 In the preceding 
example, the risk of error under each rule would be analyzed as follows. First, 
 
61  See discussion supra Section I.B. 
62  Kaye, supra note 16, at 501–02. Kaye acknowledges this point but offers a rejoinder. At 
least for parties who have frequent contact with the legal system, errors may average out over 
time. Id. This would not be the case if parties face many cases with similar values of p, such 
as where a manufacturer exposes many potential plaintiffs to the same quantified risk of 
getting a disease. But more often, some cases will be stronger than others, and the variance in 
p may help to balance out the expected risks. Id. This observation, however, has limited force. 
Most people do not have a large number of interactions with the legal system over the course 
of their lives, and thus they may find that, in a singular encounter or a small number of 
encounters, they receive the losing end of the tradeoff more than they deserve. Some others, 
of course, will be overcompensated in such rare encounters, and still others will of course be 
treated fairly. We might fairly feel that minimizing errors by singling out some individuals to 
receive a larger share, while insulating others from the same burden, is less than ideally just, 
even if we will never know which individuals are bearing the brunt of this tradeoff. 
63  Id. at 502–03. 
64  Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 18, at 1165. 
65  See id. at 1167. 
66  Id. at 1165–66. 
67  Id.; see also Joshua Davis, Expected Value Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47, 85–94 (2004); 
John S. Poole, Improving the Reliability of Management Forecasts, 14 J. CORP. L. 547, 584 
n.182 (1989). 
21 NEV. L.J. 779 
798 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
for the standard rule, we expect a squared error of .49*.49*D*D, or about 24% 
of the squared damages. Next, for the linear rule, we expect a squared error of 
.25*.25*D*D + .25*.25*D *D = .0625D2 + .0625D2, for a total of about 13% of 
the squared damages. Such a test formalizes the intuition that a rule that imposes 
twice the risk of error on one party and none of the risk on the other party is 
worse than one that spreads half that risk evenly across both parties. 
If we consider both rules in a more general way under the squared-error test, 
we can quickly see that the linear rule has strong advantages in terms of 
minimizing the risk of larger errors imposed on individual parties. For the 
conventional rule, we can express the sum of the squared expected errors as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑢𝑚_𝑜𝑓_𝐸"(𝑝) 	= 	𝑝"𝐷"	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	{0 ≤ 	𝑝 ≤ 	0.5} 
𝑆𝑢𝑚_𝑜𝑓_𝐸"(𝑝) = 	 (1 − 𝑝)"𝐷"	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	{0.5	 < 	𝑝 ≤ 	1} 
While the linear rule has the following squared-error expression: 
𝑆𝑢𝑚_𝑜𝑓_𝐸"(𝑝) = 	2𝑝"	(1 − 𝑝)"	𝐷"	 
The following graph shows what we should expect if we sum the squared 
expected errors of each rule across the whole range of guilt probabilities. As one 
can see, the discontinuous rule performs quite poorly on the squared-error test, 
due to its tendency to concentrate the entire risk of error on the losing party: 
 
The average expected squared error across the whole range is 8.3% of the 
squared damages for the existing rule, while it is only 6.67% of the squared 
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damages under the linear rule.68 If we think large errors are particularly 
problematic, or simply value equality of treatment, this may lead us to think that 
the cost-of-error consideration weighs less heavily as a reason to favor the 
existing rule. 
And in fact, there are reasons to think that the actual concentration of error 
under our existing rule is even more severe than the theory above would suggest. 
In theory, cases may be brought that will result in any level of confidence in guilt 
or liability. In practice, both party incentives and procedural limits will tend to 
produce a larger share of cases where the jury’s ultimate confidence levels will 
be close to the proof threshold level, especially under our traditional burden of 
proof rule. For one thing, most cases where there is very little reason to think the 
defendant is guilty will probably never be brought in the first place, because 
plaintiffs and prosecutors usually have little to gain by bringing a sure-loser. For 
another, pre-trial practice typically works to weed out such cases when they are 
brought.69 On the other end of the scale, defendants are likely to seek to settle or 
plea bargain in most cases where losing at trial seems to be a sure thing, because 
they too have little to gain by incurring trial costs when the outcome is so clear.70 
As a result, cases actually brought to trial will not be uniformly distributed with 
respect to likely confidence levels, but should instead be clustered closer to the 
burden’s threshold level.71 
 
68  This can be derived by integrating both squared error functions over their range. Since the 
step-function’s squared error term is symmetric around 0.5, this can be derived in the 
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While the average squared error term for the linear function is obtained with the following 
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69  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (permitting judges to dismiss cases that “fail[] to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding 
that judges should dismiss cases under this standard if the facts alleged in a complaint fail to 
make it plausible that the plaintiff will obtain relief on the merits). 
70  There will, of course, be some cases where the prosecutor, seeking to make an example of 
a defendant by imposing a maximum penalty, refuses to accept any plea bargains. These cases, 
however, will be the exception rather than the rule in a busy criminal justice system. 
71  George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3–4 (1984); see also Michael Heise & Martin T. Wells, Revisiting Eisenberg and 
Plaintiff Success: State Court Civil Trial and Appellate Outcomes, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 516, 535 (2016) (finding an average plaintiff trial win rate of 54% across all civil case 
types, with some variation based on case types); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to 
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But as the graphs above have shown, it is precisely in these close cases that 
the present system will impose the greatest risk of large errors on individual 
parties. At the extreme, consider civil cases where a jury finds that the two 
parties’ cases are truly in equipoise, so that they have a 50% confidence level in 
liability. In such cases, the law says that all plaintiffs should lose. But if the jury’s 
confidence level is well-calibrated to the actual likelihoods of liability in these 
cases, that implies that half of these cases are being decided erroneously in the 
sense that a deserving plaintiff is being given nothing, and a defendant who acted 
wrongfully will not have to account for the harm that they have caused. Of 
course, because the cases are so close, we have no way of untangling who is in 
which group. On the upside, half of the plaintiffs and defendants are being treated 
exactly correctly. But there is a serious downside, in that we have maximized the 
error in the remaining cases, giving a sizeable number of deserving plaintiffs 
nothing at all.72 
Under these circumstances, we might well wonder if it would be fairer to 
balance the harms, by awarding only 50% of the damages in all these equally 
divided cases. Now, every case receives some amount of error, in that the 
undeserving plaintiffs receive a partial windfall from defendants who did nothing 
wrong. But the upside is that the other group is harmed only half as much. Given 
that there is no way to avoid causing harm in the aggregate in this situation, we 
might well conclude that it is better to spread it evenly rather than to concentrate 
it among a sub-group of cases.73 
Of course, cases involving a perfect equality of strength between the parties’ 
cases will be rare. More often, one side or the other will have a small advantage. 
Still, some scholars have expressed concern that awarding total victory to one 
party when the evidence is close, but in their favor, can still lead to an outcome 
we view as undesirable.74 Consider the classic “Gatecrasher Hypothetical,” first 
formulated by L. Jonathan Cohen.75 In this stylized example, 499 individuals 
 
Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 315, 
323–24 (1999) (noting that factors unrelated to the closeness of the case, such as one party’s 
desire to set a precedent for future cases, may also influence the likelihood that cases will be 
tried). This distribution might shift a bit under the continuous rule, which produces slightly 
smaller incentives to settle hard cases (but greater incentives to settle easy ones). See generally 
Spottswood, supra note 59. In any event, the disparity in expected squared errors for the 
conventional rule is so extreme in the middle range that the shift in selection effects would 
have to be massively biased toward the extremes in order to make the linear rule disadvantages 
on this metric, and there is no theoretic reason to expect such an extreme shift. 
72  A method of formalizing this intuition, using a sum-of-squared-errors test, will be 
illustrated in the next section. 
73  See John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and 
Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750, 756–57 (1964) (raising an early version of this argument but 
limiting it to 50/50 cases). 
74  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1510 (1999); L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 74–81 
(1977). 
75  COHEN, supra note 74, at 75. 
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paid for admission to a rodeo performance, but the manager discovered 1000 
people sitting in the audience on the night of the show.76 Moreover, no physical 
ticket stubs were issued, so there is no way to sort out the paying patrons from 
the gate-crashers.77 Assume that this is the sum total of evidence we can amass, 
and now imagine that the rodeo sues one of the patrons for the price of a ticket. 
Should it prevail? 
The classic approach, under a discontinuous burden, is to say that yes, the 
probability of illegal entry is .501, so the rodeo should prevail. Of course, one 
possible implication of this is that the rodeo can recover the full price of a ticket 
from all 1000 of the persons seated that night, and thus recover quite a bit more 
than it is actually owed. Many scholars have seen this outcome as perverse, and 
have attempted to argue against it, usually by suggesting that there is something 
inadequate about proof via “naked statistical evidence” or (more fundamentally) 
the notion of probabilistic judgments of liability.78 But such scholars must 
struggle to justify the opposite outcome, which is that the rodeo can recover 
nothing, because we do know, in fact, that the rodeo operators were substantially 
wronged on the night in question. Once again, under the existing rule, we see 
that errors are concentrated in a way we find hard to stomach. Perhaps we allow 
the rodeo to recover from each patron, based on the fact that the probability of 
gate-crashing is 50.1% for each of them. This, however, will lead many innocent 
patrons to pay the rodeo owners a windfall. Or perhaps we simply allow the 
rodeo to recover from the first 501 customers it sues, in which case the rodeo is 
fairly compensated, but the attendees are treated unequally in terms of the risk 
of error.79 Or we might reject such proof by “naked statistics” altogether, in 
which case the enterprise can receive no compensation at all for the torts 
committed against it. From the standpoint of fairness, none of these answers 
seem very satisfactory. The continuous burden, by contrast, does a better job: 
 
76  David Kaye, The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 
101. 
77  Id. Or at least, let us assume this for the purpose of the example. In real life, testimonial 
evidence would no doubt raise and lower the probability of gate-crashing for particular 
patrons. Likewise, we must ignore reasons why the rodeo might bring a suit in the real world, 
such as litigation costs or bad publicity, or the possibility that a victory for the defense might 
incentivize future rodeo-operators to issue tickets. Cf. id., at 106 (suggesting that a victory for 
the defense might be justifiable on this basis). The point is to isolate certain details in order to 
probe our intuitions about fairness, not to describe a perfectly realistic scenario. 
78  Id. at 104; see also G. Alexander Nunn, Note, The Incompatibility of Due Process and 
Naked Statistical Evidence, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1421–23 (2015); Edward K. Cheng, 
Essay, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1269–71 (2013); ALEX 
STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 82–83 (2005); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt 
and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192–94 (1979) 
(developing the similarly structured “Prison Yard” hypothetical); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by 
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340–41 
(developing the similar “Blue Bus” hypothetical). 
79  Kaye has pointed out that the doctrine of unjust enrichment might be applied to forestall 
further recovery after the first 501 defendants have paid full damages, which would lead to 
this result. Kaye, supra note 76, at 104. 
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since we cannot distinguish between the patrons, we treat them equally, with 
some paying a bit more than they should and some paying a bit less. The rodeo, 
by this method, receives exactly80 as much payment as it is owed (since the over-
compensation errors balance out the under-compensation errors). 
The same considerations apply even more strongly when we consider 
criminal cases. Most commentators agree that wrongful convictions are a 
particularly grave type of legal error, given both the direct harm of imprisonment 
and the collateral consequences of becoming a convicted criminal.81 What is less 
widely appreciated is that the risks of wrongful conviction vary across cases.82 
In some cases, we can be exceedingly confident that the accused has committed 
the crime charged. For instance, imagine a drug transaction in which the 
purchaser was an undercover officer who also recorded the exchange using a 
hidden video camera, and which was also witnessed by three bystanders with no 
apparent biases in favor of either the prosecution or the defense. Such 
considerations may not remove all possible doubt, but the risk of error in such a 
case is exceedingly remote. Now consider, instead, a case in which the key 
evidence against the accused consists of eyewitness testimony under challenging 
viewing conditions,83 or the testimony of a former co-conspirator who gained 
substantial benefits from a prosecutor for cooperating.84 Such situations should 
lead to lowered jury confidence precisely because we have good reason to think 
that some such accusations will turn out to be false. A continuous burden of proof 
can take this concern into account by offering a lowered punishment, and thus 
mitigate the potential harm of a wrongful conviction in precisely the cases where 
they are most likely to occur. The discontinuous burden, by contrast, will often 
impose the full sanction regardless of the increased likelihood of wrongful 
conviction. 
Some readers may naturally worry, at this point, that the continuous burden 
creates an additional risk of wrongful convictions in cases that cannot meet the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” threshold test. This is a legitimate concern; after 
all, we should expect even more errors in cases where the jury thinks guilt is 60% 
likely, for instance, than in the cases that barely satisfy the existing threshold. 
 
80  This is, again, assuming that we implement the continuous burden in its strongest, linear 
form. For reasons I will discuss infra Part III, we might wish to balance this error-spreading 
function against other considerations, such as error-cost minimization. 
81  See, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 13 
(2012); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 789 (2007). 
82  Cf. Risinger, supra note 81, at 784–88 (exploring some of the factors that might give rise 
to variance in the likelihood of wrongful convictions across different types of criminal cases). 
83  See generally SIMON, supra note 81, at 50–89 (surveying weaknesses in eyewitness 
identification testimony). 
84  Eli Paul Mazur, Rational Expectations of Leniency: Implicit Plea Agreements and the 
Prosecutor's Role as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1346 (2002) (discussing the 
serious reasons to doubt the reliability of accusations by former accomplices who testify in 
connection with generous plea agreements). 
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Imagine, for instance, a set of 10 defendants, each convicted of a crime that 
carries a maximum penalty of 10 years, based on a finding that guilt is 50% 
likely. It might seem cold comfort indeed to subject all 10 defendants to a 5-year 
prison term, knowing that half of them had been wrongfully convicted! But here 
we must clarify an aspect of the continuous burden that can easily be neglected 
for the sake of brevity at other points in this discussion: Just because a burden is 
continuous, does not imply that its range of possible sanctions must scale linearly 
with the jury’s confidence in guilt. There are many possible ways we can link 
confidence to guilt, and we can adjust the sanctions we issue to reflect precisely 
the kind of concerns described above. 
Thus, imagine that we believed that the appropriate punishment for a serious 
assault was a five-year prison sentence, assuming we knew with near-perfect 
confidence that the crime had truly been committed by the defendant. If we 
wished to avoid the under-deterrence and inequality of outcome considerations 
described above, we might choose a punishment scale that gives declining prison 
terms down to a 75% likelihood of guilt, which is towards the lower end of what 
judges or lay jurors might associate with proof beyond a reasonable doubt.85 
Below that level, but above the 50% level, we might assess a smoothly declining 
set of fines or jail stays and define the resulting offense as a misdemeanor to 
reduce its collateral consequences. Below the 50% level, the consequences might 
be even smaller fines, defined as civil penalties to further reduce the collateral 
consequences, but with the potential to increase future sanctions in the event of 
recidivism. And of course, we could implement such a system without requiring 
the jury to understand the underlying mathematics, by having them report their 
 
85  There is some disagreement on exactly how one might quantify the notion of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but commonly given figures tend to center in a range from 80 to 90% 
confidence. Compare Vargas v. Keane, 86 F.3d 1273, 1281, 1283 (2d Cir. 1996) (Weinstein, 
J., concurring) (reporting a small survey given to sitting federal jurors, in which they were 
asked to quantify varying formulations of the BRD standard, and gave averaged answers 
ranging from 79–94%, depending on the formulation, with wide levels of individual variation 
among jurors, even when evaluating the same formulations), and United States v. Fatico, 458 
F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reporting the results of a survey of judges, in which 
estimates of the strength of the standard ranged from 76% to 95%), with C.M.A. McCauliff, 
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees, 35 
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982) (reporting the results of a similar survey sent to judges, in 
which a majority clustered in the range given above, but in which there were a significant 
number of judges who felt that the standard required 98, 99, or even 100% certainty). 
Laypeople commonly give answers clustered in the 80-90% range when asked what the 
standard should be but may use lower implicit thresholds when asked to recommend how a 
case should be resolved. See generally Svein Magnussen et al., The Probability of Guilt in 
Criminal Cases: Are People Aware of Being ‘Beyond Reasonable Doubt’?, 28 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 196, 196, 198, 200 (2014) (reviewing literature and reporting additional 
experimental evidence that the standard in action is lower than the standard as stated by judges, 
with participants convicting at a 0.6 level when acting individually and at a 0.7 level following 
deliberations); David H. Kaye et al., Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to 
Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797, 823 (2007) 
(finding that jurors would likely vote to convict based on pre-deliberation probabilities of .68, 
and post-deliberation probabilities of 0.76). 
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confidence level, with the court then determining the amount of punishment by 
following a pre-determined schedule. 
 
A straightforward mathematical way to devise such smooth gradations will 
be explored in more detail in Section III, below. What matters for the present 
discussion is that a continuous rule need not be linear in order to give some 
deterrent effect against harder-to-prove offenses nor to reduce the number of 
parties who experience the largest legal errors. And to the extent we think that 
wrongful convictions are especially costly, we can in fact design the scale to 
decay more rapidly as confidence declines, so that lower probability offenders 
receive some consequences, but not the severe ones that make wrongful 
convictions especially troubling. 
B. Treating Like Cases Alike 
In addition to the error-spreading considerations we have just considered, a 
continuous burden may be preferable based on its ability to give more equal 
treatment to those who come before our courts. An under-appreciated cost of the 
discontinuous burden is that, in cases where a typical juror’s confidence in guilt 
or liability will likely be close to the burden’s decision threshold, small and 
irrelevant factors may tip the balance from one side to the other. The factors 
which might play a dispositive role are numerous, and many will make us 
uncomfortable: wealth (in part through its ability to purchase more effective 
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advocacy), subtle preferences for in-group members over social out-groups, halo 
effects, and evidence with excessive emotional weight may all tend to nudge jury 
members across the line from “not guilty” to “guilty.” The continuous burden 
cannot take such effects away, of course, but as we shall see, it drastically 
reduces their impact, leading to minor variances in damages amounts or sentence 
lengths, rather than the difference between winning and losing everything. 
Many worry that disparate wealth may lead to unfair outcomes in cases that 
go to trial.86 Not all attorneys have equal skill, and better funded advocates can 
invest more heavily in investigation and trial preparation.87 Of course, many 
cases have relatively clear outcomes, and even the best attorneys can only cloud 
the waters so much.88 Ergo, we should expect advocacy quality (and therefore 
wealth) to make a significant difference only in cases where a typical jury would 
find the case difficult to decide because their confidence levels lay close to the 
existing proof threshold. This can be visualized on the chart below, which shows 
the current, discontinuous burden of proof in civil trials: 
 
86  See, e.g., Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 665–
69 (2010); Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in 
State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 403, 408–09 (1987); Marc Galanter, 
Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 95, 103–04 (1974). 
87  Yoon, supra note 86, at 660–65; Wheeler et al., supra note 86, at 409. 
88  See Wheeler et al., supra note 86, at 440–41 (finding that having access to stronger legal 
counsel provided a small but measurable advantage in State Supreme Court litigation). 
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The arrow shows what happens when a disparity in advocacy quality leads 
a jury to find liability 55% likely, when they would have found it only 45% likely 
given equal quality of advocacy. Given the discontinuous burden of proof, this 
minor change in confidence radically transforms the defendant’s prospects, as 
she is now responsible for 100% of the damages. But if the same attorney was 
proceeding in a case where the jury would otherwise see liability as only 25% 
likely, the same level of skill will provide no practical benefit, because a 
defendant who is only 35% likely to be liable would still prevail under the 
existing rule. Thus, discontinuous burdens of proof can magnify small 
advantages, but this effect will primarily occur in cases close to their decision 
thresholds. 
Now notice how differently the same effects would play out in a continuous 
regime. Moving the jury from 45% confidence to 55% confidence would not 
radically change the outcome. Rather, it might adjust the damages by as little as 
10%.89 Once again, this is easiest to visualize by plotting a simple version of a 
continuous burden of proof, in which the quantity of damages increase as a linear 
function of a jury’s belief in liability, with an arrow showing the impact of a 
small change in confidence in liability: 
  
 
89  This example assumes that damages are computed as a linear function of the estimated 
likelihood of the plaintiff’s claim (l) multiplied by the plaintiff’s total compensable harm (h), 
such that D(l) = l*h. Such an approach would spread the impact of small variances in 
persuasion evenly across the whole range of estimated likelihoods, and thus would minimize 
the impacts of biased reasoning and other unfair advantages on the outcome of cases that reach 
trial. If we choose instead a different liability function as a means of balancing this with other 
considerations such as error costs, see infra Part III, these effects would no longer be 
minimized, but they would still be much reduced from their impact under the currently 
dominant step-function liability rule. 
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Of course, the flip-side of this change is that the same 10% variance can 
occur wherever the jury’s confidence levels are, so a greater number of cases 
could be impacted by advocacy effects. But I suspect that many readers may be 
less worried about wealth causing a 10% variance in sentence length or damages 
quantity, compared with a case where wealth enables guilty parties to escape 
consequences altogether. 
Nor are differences in advocacy quality the only means by which a small 
advantage might lead to outsized harm by way of a discontinuous burden of 
proof. The tendency of jurors to trust members of in-groups slightly more than 
members of out-groups may likewise tip the scales in an otherwise close case.90 
It is important to note that such effects can occur even if the members of the jury 
would not consciously endorse a biased conclusion against a person or group.91 
Rather, unconscious attitudes might shape the willingness of jury members to 
believe that a particular person would be likely to engage in wrongful conduct, 
making it easier to show that outgroup members are guilty or liable.92 Given the 
very real possibility that some juries will not be demographically 
 
90  See Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 847–
48 (2011) (reviewing studies relating to biases against out-group members). 
91  See Jennifer K. Elek & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Implicit Bias and the American Juror, 51 
CT. REV. 116, 116–17 (2015). 
92  Id. at 117. 
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representative,93 this may make it a bit harder for members of racial minorities, 
recent immigrants, or economically disadvantaged individuals to prevail in 
court, compared with white, native-born, and middle-class individuals. Once 
again, we should expect these tendencies to be modest compared with the impact 
of the strength of the evidence, but the threshold approach to proof can lead to 
dramatic disparities in close cases. 
This catalog could go further, encompassing such sources of error as halo 
effects94 or emotionally biasing evidence,95 but many readers may feel that this 
is belaboring the point. In an adversarial system, we normally expect to strike a 
rough balance across many potentially biasing features of a case, so that the 
strength of the evidence on either side can be the primary driver of legal results. 
Unfortunately, the discontinuous burden of proof makes small variances in 
confidence extremely consequential in close cases, even when they are produced 
by irrelevant or invidious factors. The continuous burden, by contrast, mitigates 
the damage that such factors can cause. 
C. Disincentivizing Spoliation? 
The advantages discussed in the preceding sections follow automatically 
from the nature of a continuous burden, along with a few other facts in which we 
can have high confidence. This section considers one other type of benefit that 
is more speculative, in that it depends on litigation dynamics that can be 
somewhat hard to predict. Still, there is reason to suppose that the existing 
structure of proof burdens magnifies the benefits that may flow from hiding or 
destroying evidence. The continuous burden, by contrast, would seem to give 
parties’ a lessened incentive to destroy documents or silence witnesses who 
might testify against them. 
Consider first the incentives that apply to spoliation under current law. On 
the one hand, destroying evidence is a high-risk strategy. If caught, parties might 
 
93  See, e.g., Jean N. Lee, The Process Is the Punishment: Juror Demographics and Case 
Administration in State Courts, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 361, 365–68 (2017) (discussing the 
tendency of “key-man” jury selection systems to produce radically unrepresentative jury 
pools); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: 
A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 55, 58–59 (2001) (providing evidence 
that attorneys’ decisions to use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors were highly 
correlated with the potential jurors’ race). 
94  Psychological “halo effects” cause us to unconsciously assume that persons with some 
positive qualities (like beauty or high social status) are more likely to carry other unrelated 
positive qualities, such as diligence or truthfulness. Spottswood, supra note 90, at 845–47 
(reviewing the literature on halo effects). 
95  See, e.g., Rebecca Hofstein Grady et al., Impact of Gruesome Photographic Evidence on 
Legal Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 25 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & L. 503, 503–04 (2018). 
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be subject to potentially damaging sanctions from a court,96 tort liability,97 or 
prosecution for obstruction of justice.98 Additionally, a jury that is told about a 
party’s attempts to hide the truth may infer the worst regarding the content of the 
evidence that is no longer available.99 Unfortunately, there are strong incentives 
to spoliate that sometimes overcome these reasons for caution.100 After all, if a 
party can tip a case from one side of the proof threshold to the other, they may 
walk away unpunished. So, if litigants anticipate losing under the existing pattern 
of evidence but think that they have a reasonable shot at prevailing once some 
evidence is destroyed, and believe they can do this without being discovered, 
they may think that the risk is worth it. 
In a continuous regime, by contrast, a party is unlikely to achieve total 
victory by removing part of the evidence. After all, it is quite rare that the entire 
case against a party will arise from a single witness or document. Rather, a jury 
must infer guilt from many overlapping sources. 
Thus, in most cases, removing an important piece of evidence would not 
lead the jury to conclude that the defendant is probably innocent, even if it would 
make the case thin enough to raise a reasonable doubt about guilt. This greatly 
alters the risk reward trade-off. As discussed above, many defendants might 
discount their future utility rather steeply, and thus be relatively insensitive to 
changes in sentence length, even if they are highly motivated to obtain a not 
guilty verdict at trial.101 Thus, they may find the risk of spoliation is no longer 
worthwhile when it involves trading off a risk of further prosecution or an 
 
96  See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that the 
district courts have the inherent power “to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which 
abuses the judicial process,” and in some cases might properly go so far as to dismiss a claim 
entirely based on the willful destruction of material evidence (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991))). 
97  See, e.g., Larison v. City of Trenton, 180 F.R.D. 261, 264 (D.N.J. 1998) (surveying states 
that have recognized tort liability for the intentional or negligent destruction of evidence). 
98  See, e.g., United States v. Jahedi, 681 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that 
courts have “consistently” held that the intentional destruction of documents with the intent to 
obstruct federal judicial proceedings is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503). 
99  See, e.g., Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
adverse inference instructions are appropriate when a party intentionally spoliates inference); 
cf. Wm. Grayson Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse Inference Instruction: 
Ensuring the Instruction Is an Effective Sanction in Electronic Discovery Cases, 64 S.C. L. 
REV. 681, 681–85 (2013) (noting the varying standards that exist in the federal circuit courts 
for granting adverse inference instructions as a spoliation sanction). 
100  See Dan H. Willoughby, Jr., et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers, 
60 DUKE L.J. 789, 803 (2010) (noting that the failure to preserve electronically stored 
information is the single most common basis for discovery sanctions). The problem is almost 
certainly quite a bit worse than it would appear based on counting decisions in which courts 
punish spoliators, however. If sanctions were certain, the rewards of spoliation would be 
minimal, and few parties would ever risk it. Thus, we may reasonably infer that a significant 
fraction of the parties who hide or destroy evidence go unpunished and that the resulting errors 
go uncorrected. 
101  See Fisher, supra note 15, at 857–58. 
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adverse inference, on the one hand, against a mere sentence reduction if they are 
successful. 
Of course, as before, there is a trade-off involved in moving to the 
continuous regime. Parties who have very high confidence that they will win or 
lose a case would have little incentive to spoliate under existing rules, because 
they would not foresee that it would change the outcome in the case. But in a 
continuous regime, such conduct could sometimes be worth the risk, simply 
because it would change the jury’s confidence level in a verdict and thus the level 
of damages or punishment imposed. Nonetheless, the amount of any such 
increase is probably small. After all, parties could still have incentives to spoliate 
evidence in easy cases under existing law, as a means of strengthening their 
negotiating position when hammering out a settlement or plea-bargain. The 
amount of extra inducement offered by the possibility of slightly changing a 
continuously variable trial verdict, compared with the already existing incentive 
to influence these bargaining outcomes, seems modest, given that trials are rare 
in comparison to settlements and plea bargains.102 Nonetheless, which of these 
two effects would dominate is ultimately an empirical question, which is why I 
have emphasized that the above analysis is tentative. As a result, we have 
reasonable grounds to think that a continuous regime would deter more 
spoliation than it would incentivize, even if this cannot be stated with certainty. 
III. DISSOLVING THE DILEMMA: THE LOGISTIC BURDEN OF PROOF 
Up until now, we have assumed (as do nearly all writers in the existing 
literature)103 that the choice of burden is dichotomous: either we stick with the 
present rule or we use a linear burden of proof rule. Such a dichotomy, if it really 
existed, would be unfortunate. Clearly, reducing errors is valuable, and so is 
deterrence, equality of treatment, and the preservation of evidence. Sadly, some 
of these goals are at odds with one another. As we have seen, a linear burden 
gives us better deterrence of wrongdoing, reduces the risk that large errors will 
be imposed on individual parties, reduces the impacts of various forms of bias at 
trial, and may also reduce the risk of spoliation.104 But the rule also increases our 
expected overall error rate from 25% to 33% of the overall damages in civil 
 
102  See Table C-4—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Business (September 30, 2019), U.S. 
CTS. (2019) https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/judicial-business/2019/09/30 [https: 
//perma.cc/4CXZ-EKJA] (showing that only 0.7% of federal civil cases were tried over the 
twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2019); PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., THE 
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 25 (2015) (noting a 4% trial rate in a multi-
state survey of state court civil cases). 
103  The main counterexamples consist of occasional considerations of a discontinuous rule 
with an intermediate step. See, e.g., Federico Picinali, Do Theories of Punishment Necessarily 
Deliver a Binary System of Verdicts? An Exploratory Essay, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 555, 557 
(2018) (exploring arguments for and against a “many-valued” system, in which there are 
intermediate verdict levels between guilty and not-guilty). 
104  Supra Part II.  
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cases.105 We might well worry that the benefits that we have discussed are not 
worth a price as steep as this. An ideal rule would be one that allows us to strike 
a reasonable balance between these competing considerations, rather than 
maximize some at the expense of others. 
Happily, such a rule does exist. This part lays out an alternative form of 
continuous burden of persuasion, the logistic burden of proof. As we shall see, 
the logistic burden is flexible in ways that the other two standards are not. It is 
able to take many forms that are intermediate between the two extremes, and 
thereby enable us to strike the kind of balance discussed above. Moreover, on 
one measure (minimization of large losses) it actually outperforms both of the 
discontinuous and the linear burden. Thus, there are strong reasons to think that 
the ideal form of proof burden is logistic. 
A. Understanding the Logistic Burden 
Logistic functions let one construct a curve that takes a kind of flattened “S” 
shape, first rising slowly, then more quickly, then more slowly again.106 In its 
most basic form, the logistic function is defined by the following equation: 
𝑓(𝑥) = 	
1
1 + 𝑒'( 
The addition of constants allows us to define a logistic curve that lies neatly 
between the boundaries of a discontinuous step function, on one hand, and a 
continuous linear function, on the other. Moreover, an intelligent choice of 
parameters will allow us to define logistic functions that rise more steeply or 
slowly, centered around any inflection point we like. The following examples 
will make use of the following modification of the basic logistic equation, with 
p once again representing the jury’s confidence level with respect to guilt or 
liability. In addition, we add three constants: r, which varies the steepness with 
which the curve inflects towards its center, and C1 and C2, which are used to 
position it so that it observes certain basic features that are desirable in a civil 
burden of proof, such as awarding 0 damages at 0 confidence in guilt, 50% of 
the damages at 50% confidence, and full damages at 100% confidence.107  
 
105  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
106  Joos Korstanje, Modeling Logistic Growth, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://towardsdatascience.com/modeling-logistic-growth-1367dc971de2 
[https://perma.cc/8L5S-CP2H] (explaining the mathematical function).  
107  If we wish to tune the function to observe the constraints derived in text, the values of 𝐶! 
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These features permit us to design a continuous burden of proof that can be 
arbitrarily close to either a straight line or a step function, as the following graphs 
will illustrate. At one extreme, the logistic function can take a nearly linear 
shape108: 
 
And at the other extreme, it can be defined so that it is nearly identical to the 
discontinuous rule over most of its range, while still smoothing out the transition 
where the discontinuous rule’s threshold would apply109: 
  
 
108  The low steepness graph is determined by r=3, 𝐶!= 1.574, and	𝐶'= -0.287. The function 
could in fact lie much closer to the line, and this amount of variation is used only for ease of 
visualization. 
109  The high steepness graph is given by r=50, C1=1 and C2=0. 
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Most usefully, the logistic function can take a shape that is intermediate 
between these two extremes, allowing us to strike a true balance between 
objectives such as error minimization and deterrence110: 
  
 
110  The intermediate burden’s parameters are r=8.155, C1=1.03 and C2=-0.07. Although these 
might seem somewhat arbitrary, the discussion infra will reveal that in addition to producing 
a logistic burden that lies neatly in the middle of the two extremes, they also optimize the sum 
of squared-expected errors. 
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B. The Logistic Burden’s Benefits 
While this mathematical exercise may seem arcane to some legal readers, it 
has a very practical pay-off. First, note that all of these logistic functions, even 
the one that increases very steeply, assign 50% punishment at the 50% 
confidence mark. Thus, unlike a standard discontinuous burden rule, the logistic 
rule would always permit a civil jury to split the risk of error evenly when they 
feel the strength of the parties’ cases is truly in equipoise.111 Moreover, all of 
these rules would blunt the problematic effects of proof discontinuities on the 
equality of outcomes by reducing the amount of influence that small, legally 
irrelevant nudges towards one verdict or another can have on damages. And as 
the logistic burden rule grows closer to the linear one, we should expect to realize 
a more optimal quantity of deterrence, reduce the average magnitude of legal 
errors, and possibly decrease incentives towards spoliation of evidence.112 
 
111  See Coons, supra note 73, at 756–57 (doubting that there is any equitable reason to award 
true ties to the defense, rather than splitting the verdict evenly in such cases). 
112  See discussion supra Part II. 
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Best of all, the logistic burden lets us balance these advantages against the 
rise in error costs we can expect as we move towards a linear rule. We can 
construct expected error functions for the logistic curve as follows113: 










+	C2% ∗ 𝑝 
When we graph this error curve for the logistic liability rule side-by-side 
with the others that Kaye explored,114 we can see that the logistic rule always lies 
between the other two functions in terms of its overall expected rate of error.115 
Thus, we can choose parameters for it that strike whatever balance between the 
costs and benefits that we prefer. The low-steepness, nearly linear logistic burden 
we saw before yields an expected error curve that is just a bit better than the 





113  Errors favoring the plaintiff will simply be the value given by the logistic function, 
multiplied by the expected probability that the defendant is not liable, which is 1-p: 





+	𝐶'H ∗ (1 − 𝑝)  
Errors favoring the defendant will be the amount of the verdict not paid to the plaintiff under 
the logistic rule, multiplied by p, the probability of liability, as follows: 





+	𝐶'H ∗ 𝑝  
And the total error function, Etotal, will simply be the sum of E1 and E2, which is expressed 
above in text. 
114  See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text. 
115  The following graphs use the same parameters for the logistic burden as the low, moderate, 
and high steepness versions illustrated above. The error curves for the linear and discontinuous 
rules are also the same as those illustrated above. 
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Next, as we might expect, the parameters previously chosen for a moderate 
logistic burden yield an expected error curve that is between the two extremes. 
Its increase in expected error over the traditional rule is just less than half the 
size of what we expect with the linear rule (from 25% of the damages to 28.7% 
instead of the increase to 33.3% we get with a linear rule).116 
  
 
116  This value is again obtained by integrating the expected error function for the logistic 















Given the complexity of the integrand, I computed the value reported above. 
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And the high-steepness logistic curve, which approximates the linear 
function, manages to smooth the central discontinuity while yielding a nearly 
identical rate of expected errors (and increase from 25% to only 25.1% of 




117  This was also computed using the above integral, with the values of r=50, C1=1 and C2=0. 
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It is also illuminating to compare the squared-error curves of the three rules, 
to see how the logistic burden118 stacks up in terms of its ability to avoid 
imposing particularly large errors on individual parties. On this metric, the 
logistic curve actually outperforms both of the other rules, across a wide range 
of parameter values. First, we can see that the low-steepness, approximately 
linear version has a lower expected squared-error value than both rules in its 
central range, while slightly exceeding the linear rule’s values at high and low 
values of jury confidence: 
  
 
118  The sum-of-squared-errors function for the logistic burden is as follows: 













The values of the C1, C2, and r constants for the low-, moderate-, and high-steepness logistic 
burdens are as given above. 
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The logistic burden with moderate parameters does an even better job, 
managing to match or outperform both rules across the entire range of jury 
confidence levels: 
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Finally, the “smoothed step-function,” high-steepness version of the logistic 
burden performs admirably in the high and low ranges of jury confidence levels, 
but shows a tendency to magnify errors in its central range (although not to the 
full extent of the traditional rule): 
As these graphs illustrate, if we wish to obtain almost all of the error 
reduction of a step-function rule, we can do so with a logistic burden of proof 
that still eases the sharpness of the transition near the step-function’s 
discontinuity, allowing some of the benefits discussed above. Moreover, one can 
easily survey the range of logistic parameters to find the version of the rule that 
minimizes overall expected squared errors. The following chart shows the 
overall expected error rate for each value of r between 0 and 50, with the scaling 
constants adjusted so that the burden always imposes 0 liability at 0 jury 
confidence, 50% liability at 50% confidence, and full liability at 100% 
confidence.   
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As can be seen, the logistic rule dominates both other rules across a very 
wide range of shapes on this metric. Zooming in, we can locate the optimal 
parameters from the standpoint of minimizing squared errors: 
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As can be seen in this last chart, the logistic burden has a minimized value 
of expected squared-error (and thus the expected magnitude of errors that will 
be inflicted on individual parties) at the values of r=8.155, C1=1.03 and 
C2=-0.07. This is the “moderate steepness” version of the rule I have illustrated 
above. 
Several things are therefore notable about this intermediate formulation of 
the logistic burden of proof. First, as already shown, it minimizes the risk of very 
large errors inflicted on any single party in a case. Second, although it increases 
the absolute risk of overall error beyond what the traditional rule does, it does so 
by less than half of what the linear burden of proof would do. Third, by imposing 
some penalties in cases below the 0.5 threshold, and less than full penalties for 
cases that lie above that threshold but below full confidence, it is likely to give 
more optimal deterrence of wrongdoing than the traditional rule. Similarly, 
because the gains of destroying evidence are less likely to move a party from full 
liability to zero liability, it should reduce incentives towards spoliation. 
This rule also goes a long way towards reducing the impact of unfair 
influences at trials. As discussed above, an influence such as racial bias or the 
ability to afford more effective advocacy is generally likely to shift overall jury 
confidence levels by only modest amounts.119 But since the traditional rule filters 
out “easy” cases through settlements while encouraging parties to take closer 
cases to trial, it can lead to such small influences radically changing a party’s 
outcome, leading to substantial concerns about inequality of treatment of 
litigants. 
This may be clearest if we revisit our earlier example, in which an improper 
influence on the jury shifted their confidence levels in liability from 45% to 
55%.120 Under the traditional rule, this results in a change in the outcome of 
100% of the damages, while under the linear rule, it results in only a 10% 
increase in damages. Now consider the impact under the square-error-optimized 
logistic burden of proof: 
  
 
119  See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
120  See supra Section II.B. 
21 NEV. L.J. 779 
Spring 2021] CONTINUOUS BURDENS OF PROOF 823 
Instead of a 10% increase, this version of the logistic burden increases the 
share of total damages awarded from 40% to 60%. While this does represent a 
doubled increase from the linear rule, it is only 20% of the change that our 
existing rule would yield, which is still a large improvement. So to sum up, this 
variant of the logistic burden minimizes large errors, cuts the impact of biases 
and similar influences by 80% in close cases, and otherwise strikes a balance 
between the worthy goals of deterring wrongdoing and minimizing total error. 
All things considered, this form of the rule clearly merits serious consideration 
for those who wish to improve the overall functioning of our trial process.121 
Finally, although it might seem challenging to implement a logistic burden 
in an ordinary courtroom with lay jurors, the obstacles are almost certainly 
smaller than one might initially assume. A jury need not be instructed on the 
math included in the footnotes of this section in order for a court to implement a 
logistic burden. Rather, a jury could merely be instructed to report their degree 
of belief in liability, represented on a scale from 0 to 100% confidence, in place 
of their current, dichotomous verdict decisions. Nor would judges be required to 
understand the intricacies of logistic functions, as they could be provided with 
 
121  Of course, it is quite possible that some readers will prefer to strike a different trade-off 
among these competing values. If we think that the values of deterrence, equality of treatment, 
and spoliation reduction warrant a larger deviation from error minimization, we can choose a 
rule (such as the low steepness logistic burden) that gives these concerns greater weight. Or 
conversely, those who care the most about reducing overall errors can obtain almost full 
realization of the step-function’s benefits on that score while smoothing its discontinuity by 
choosing a high-steepness logistic burden. 
21 NEV. L.J. 779 
824 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
software that seamlessly translates the jury’s confidence level and damages 
determination into a specific verdict amount, or even a simple table that matches 
jury confidence levels with the damages that should be awarded under the 
optimized logistic burden. The only persons who would ever need to grapple 
with the details of the logistic function would be rule-makers, who would 
necessarily have to decide what balance to strike between the competing goals 
of error-reduction, on the one hand, and deterrence, equality of treatment, error-
spreading, and spoliation reduction, on the other.122 
IV. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A CONTINUOUS BURDEN 
In the preceding parts, I have set forth some reasons why adopting 
continuous burdens of proof would be beneficial for all kinds of cases within our 
legal system. Of course, anyone who has studied the history of trial by jury 
knows that it is an institution that is slow to evolve. Moreover, when major 
changes happen, it is usually in the wake of a highly visible crisis in the court 
system, rather than as a response to considered reflection.123 In addition, legal 
change typically exhibits some amount of path dependency, and as we shall see, 
some existing aspects of American law would make it very hard to adopt a 
continuous burden across the board within our legal system. Such obstacles do 
not make analysis of the foregoing kind useless, however. It is always hard to 
predict when crises may come and what shape they may take, so there is value 
in having thought through issues in advance. Moreover, obstacles that exist in 
one country may be absent in another, and even seemingly unshakeable doctrines 
sometimes give way over time.124 Still, some readers may yearn for more readily 
 
122  One interesting aspect of such an analysis, which I do not have space to fully explore in 
this Article, is the possibility that the appropriate parameters might be adjusted to counteract 
certain biases in estimating probabilistic likelihoods of guilt. One potentially relevant bias that 
might be taken into account is the tendency to give evidence greater or lesser weight depending 
on whether it is coherent with a juror’s existing intuitive view of the case. Such tendencies 
can result in estimates of guilt that are systematically pulled towards extreme values, leading 
jurors in close cases to think that one result is obviously more defensible than the other. See 
generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511 (2004). Such a tendency will naturally tend to pull estimations 
of guilt probability away from the mean, so that a given punishment function will resemble a 
somewhat steeper logistic function in its actual impact. Accordingly, if we could obtain 
consistent and reliable measures of this tendency across likely jurors, we might wish to adopt 
a logistic curve of lower steepness than would otherwise make sense on policy grounds, 
knowing that the coherence bias would lead to more steeply diverging assignments of damages 
or sentences than the function would assign if given unbiased inputs. 
123  See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, Truth, Lies, and the Confrontation Clause, 89 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 566, 570–78 (2018) (describing the crisis of widely acknowledged perjuries that led to 
the development of the law of hearsay and the criminal defendant’s right to confront adverse 
witnesses). 
124  See generally, A. Leo Levin et al., From Competency to Rules of Limited Exclusion: 
Seeking Better Tools for the Search for Truth, 27 LITIG. 23 (2001) (describing the downfall of 
the witness competency rules that provided the primary system of evidentiary control prior to 
the 1800s). 
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implementable suggestions. Accordingly, after reviewing some of the obstacles 
to widespread implementation of the continuous burden, I explore some small 
steps we might take, consistent with existing American practices, towards 
realizing some of its benefits. 
A. Implementation Challenges 
If we were designing a legal system from scratch, we might wish to 
implement continuous burdens across the board. But our existing legal system 
has a few constraining features that would make it hard to adopt such a rule so 
broadly, particularly in criminal cases. First, there is the rule of In re Winship, 
which gives constitutional mandate to the beyond a reasonable doubt threshold 
of proof in criminal cases.125 Next, most modern jurisdictions employ 
discretionary modes of criminal sentencing,126 which would complicate the 
simple transformation from confidence in guilt to sentencing outcomes described 
above. Finally, there is the inherent conservativism that our society has long 
adopted when considering reforms to the trial process.127 
In re Winship held that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is required 
by the Due Process Clause in all ordinary criminal cases, so that neither the states 
nor the federal government may impose criminal punishment based on a lower 
level of confidence.128 Winship’s rule presents a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of a continuous burden in criminal cases. If we cannot convict 
persons below the threshold of reasonable doubt, we can only maintain a 
continuous burden by beginning with zero punishment at the lowest level of 
confidence that meets the standard, and rising upwards from there. But under 
such a rule, the very low levels of punishment that would be required at low 
levels of confidence above the threshold would seem far too low to offer 
adequate deterrence or punishment, especially for crimes like murder or serious 
assaults. We could still obtain some benefits in terms of reducing the maximum 
expected errors by implementing an escalating punishment function in the range 
from reasonable doubt to certainty of guilt.129 Under some assumptions, this 
might also yield an additional benefit to deterrence.130 But closely tied to the 
Winship rule is the widespread hostility of many courts to any attempts to define 
 
125  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
126  Richard S. Frase, A Consumers’ Guide to Sentencing Reform: Reflections on Zimring’s 
Cautionary Tale, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L., Fall 2018, at 1, 23. 
127  In addition to these considerations, the varying modes of criminal sanction, and the impacts 
of collateral consequences, would require careful consideration if we wished to design a 
continuous burden of proof for criminal cases. See generally Avlana K. Eisenberg, 
Discontinuity in Criminal Law, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming 2021). 
128  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 368. 
129  Cf. Lando, supra note 15, at 285 (arguing for a regime of criminal penalties that vary based 
on the jury’s confidence in guilt, but only above a threshold level of confidence). 
130  Id. at 281–83 (arguing that escalating punishments based on confidence levels allows us 
to distribute limited punishment resources in a way that is more likely to deter future 
wrongdoing). 
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the reasonable doubt threshold in probabilistic terms.131 In the absence of such a 
definition, we would be hard pressed to articulate the range within which the 
remaining flexibility could operate. And of course, the other benefits of a 
continuous burden, such as mitigating unequal treatment and possibly 
disincentivizing spoliation, would be much reduced once we reintroduce a large 
discontinuity at the level of reasonable doubt.132 
In addition to this well-rooted constitutional doctrine, those seeking to 
introduce continuous burdens in American criminal trials would face a second 
major obstacle, in the form of modern sentencing doctrine. Historically, many 
states and the federal government had given judges broad discretion concerning 
the length of a sentence that a convicted offender would receive, so long as it fell 
within the overall statutory range for an offense.133 In Apprendi v. Washington, 
however, the Supreme Court placed a clear boundary on that flexibility: judges 
may not rely on additional findings to levy sentences outside of the normal range 
applicable to the crime for which a jury had convicted a defendant, unless those 
findings had also been made by a jury, subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard.134 Meanwhile the federal government, and several states,135 have 
moved to rein in judges’ sentencing discretion even further through the use of 
mandatory sentencing guidelines, out of concern that the discretion produced 
indefensible variation among punishments given in factually similar cases.136 In 
response to this trend, the Court held that such innovations also violated the 
principle in Apprendi, at least so long as the judges were mandatorily bound to 
make upward adjustments in sentences on the basis of facts not found by a 
jury.137 The only way that sentencing guidelines can continue in force is if they 
 
131  See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983) (“Any attempt to quantify 
[the standard] may impermissibly lower the prosecution’s burden of proof, and is likely to 
confuse rather than clarify.”). See generally Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, Case 
Comment, United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral 
Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?, 5 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 135–36 (2006) (collecting cases). 
132  For this reason, I have not attempted to specify a precise mathematical form for criminal 
burdens in the analysis above. 
133  See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). This was itself an evolution away 
from earlier common law practice, in which judges were bound to issue fixed and determinate 
sentences for particular offenses. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479–80 (2000). 
The seeming severity of that rule was mediated in practice by the frequent recommendation 
by judges that selected defendants receive royal reprieves or pardons. See JOHN M. BEATTIE, 
CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660–1800, at 409 (1986). 
134  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
135  See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE 
SYSTEM 5 (2013) (describing the spread of guidelines-based models among the states). 
136  Id. at xii. 
137  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
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are merely advisory in nature, preserving to the trial judge the power to depart 
from their recommendations.138 
Thus, the sentencing regime would further complicate the institution of a 
continuous burden in criminal cases. At best, juries might announce a confidence 
level in guilt, which would then form the center of a statutory range, within which 
the court’s sentencing discretion would be preserved. Or alternatively, a judge’s 
sentencing discretion might be expanded to permit the judge’s own confidence 
levels to be used as a reason for varying sentences within the legislatively 
imposed range. Some have even speculated that judges may already be doing 
this privately, whether consciously or otherwise.139 
So Winship stands firmly in the way of implementing continuous burdens in 
criminal cases, and the nature of modern sentencing adds further complications. 
The final obstacle, although entirely informal, may be the biggest roadblock of 
all: the innate conservatism of lawyers when considering reforms to trial 
procedure. This conservatism, more than anything else, leads me to doubt that 
any jurisdiction will fully adopt a continuous burden of proof anytime soon. 
Since most of the harms wrought by a dichotomous burden are subtle and hard 
to detect in any individual case, it seems unlikely that a crisis might arise that 
would force policymakers to reconsider such a long-standing part of the trial 
ritual. Nonetheless, given the strong arguments in favor of the continuous 
burden, it makes sense to consider some more modest ways in which it could be 
partially implemented, with less likelihood of resistance. 
B. Areas Where Continuous Burdens May Meet Less Resistance 
Despite the concerns raised in the previous section, there are a number of 
settings in which a continuous burden might be adopted with far less resistance. 
First, a great deal of fact-finding occurs outside of courts, typically with more 
flexibility than we see in a traditional trial. Second, there are some categories of 
civil cases where the dichotomous burden seems particularly ill-suited to do 
justice, such as the area of toxic torts, which might naturally be a good starting 
point for experimenting with a continuous burden. Adoption in any of these areas 
might permit judges and lawyers to gain familiarity applying a continuous 
burden, give society a chance to grow accustomed to it, and allow scholars to 
assess its costs and benefits in operation. 
To begin with, there is obvious potential for experimenting with a 
continuous burden of proof in settings where fact-finding is done outside of the 
courts. Most major employers must make factual determinations when deciding 
 
138  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (severing the portion of the federal 
sentencing guidelines that made them mandatory in application, as a means of preserving the 
constitutionality of the broader scheme). 
139  See Lando, supra note 15, at 285; see also Fisher, supra note 15, at 847–48 (suggesting 
that judges enhance sentences following a jury verdict because it gives them greater certainty 
in factual guilt). 
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whether to discipline employees for workplace infractions, among other 
matters.140 Likewise, universities must inquire into facts before deciding whether 
students should be disciplined.141 Many disputes that could go to court are instead 
handled by arbitrators, whether through a pre-dispute agreement or a decision to 
avoid the high costs and delays of court proceedings once a claim has been 
brought.142 And finally, many administrative agencies, at both the state and the 
federal level, operate their own internal dispute resolution systems, in which 
administrative law judges hold hearings to determine such matters as benefit 
determinations, worker’s compensation payments, or the deportability of 
aliens.143 
Two factors make instituting continuous burdens more feasible. First, they 
all involve a fair amount of flexibility as to the form that a fact-finding inquiry 
should take.144 Employers can choose whatever manner of internal investigation 
best suits their goals, for instance, and arbitrators can use any procedures that do 
not violate the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreements or governing law.145 
Second, the public devotes less attention to studying the details of such 
procedures, and they rarely form the basis of stirring TV dramas. As a result, 
decision-makers in these settings may be more willing to experiment, with less 
worry about “corrupting” ancient institutions and less fear of public outcry. 
Still, not all determinations made in less-formal contexts would be a good 
fit for continuous burdens. The key factor that has made the continuous burden 
a theoretically attractive option in so many modern court cases is the fact that 
modern remedies and punishments are generally easy to vary on a smooth scale. 
Both damages payments and prison sentences can easily be increased or 
decreased in order to correspond with varying levels of confidence. And some 
less-formal fact-finding is used in service of similarly flexible outcomes as well. 
An administrative law judge determining an appropriate level of compensation 
for a past harm, for instance, could operate much like a civil jury would under a 
 
140  See generally Theodore R. Lotchin, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished? Establishing 
a Self-Evaluative Privilege for Corporate Internal Investigations, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1137, 1138–39 (2004). 
141  See Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities Should 
Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 KAN. L. REV. 915, 923 (2016). 
142  See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in 
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 120–28, 136–43 (2010). 
143  See Benjamin Kapnik, Affirming the Status Quo?: The FCC, ALJs, and Agency 
Adjudications, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1527, 1531–33 (2012). 
144  See Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge Between Law and 
Culture, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 4–8 (2003). 
145  See James J. Sentner, Jr., Arbitrator Discretion: Should It Be Restricted by Party 
Stipulation of Governing Procedural Rules?, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 77, 78–
79 (noting that most arbitration agreements leave broad discretion to the arbitrators over the 
mode and order of proceeding). 
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continuous burden rule.146 But some consequences are, in their nature, 
discontinuous. We cannot order 75% of a deportation, for instance. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that less severe remedies can be ordered on a scale 
below a more serious and irrevocable outcome, we can imagine implementing 
partially continuous standard up to a reasonably high level of confidence, at 
which point the dichotomous decision is issued. Consider, for example, the 
ongoing controversy regarding standards of proof in campus investigations into 
student-on-student sexual misconduct.147 On the one hand, victim’s advocates 
rightfully worry that many offenders could escape all consequences if we must 
prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as in a criminal case. Many campus 
rapes will occur under situations where the accused perpetrator can plausibly 
claim consent, making the outcome turn on hard-to-unravel questions of 
credibility.148 As a result, it will be hard for most decision-makers to reach a near-
certain level of belief in guilt even when wrongdoing has truly occurred. On the 
other hand, under a preponderance rule, wrongfully accused persons might also 
reasonably fear wrongful expulsion from campus, with serious long-term 
collateral consequences, even in cases where fact-finders feel the claimant’s case 
is just stronger than a coin-toss. The result seems to be a zero-sum conflict, where 
concern for one group’s interests must necessarily lead one to be dismissive of 
the other group. 
Happily, the implementation of a continuous burden might ease both sides’ 
concerns to a significant extent. We might imagine a college’s Title IX officer 
defining a range of punishments, from a no-contact order of varying severity and 
length at low levels of confidence in guilt, through suspensions of varying length 
in the middle portions of the range, with expulsions limited to cases in which 
proof had been proved to a very high confidence level, such as 90% or above. 
Under such a rule, victims’ ability to obtain some redress for their wrong, and 
especially to avoid further contact with their rapists, would be expanded, while 
accused persons could be more confident that they would not receive truly life-
altering consequences unless university officials were strongly persuaded of 
their guilt. 
Beyond these less-formal sorts of fact-finding, let us next consider another 
arena in which continuous burdens might be reasonably attainable: civil cases 
involving liability arising from exposure to allegedly toxic substances. Such 
cases present a number of recurring problems that make them especially ill-
suited to a step-function liability rule, only some of which have been addressed 
 
146  Cf. Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann, The Federal Black Lung Program—The 
View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575, 585–90 (1985) (describing the administrative 
process by which claimants can recover benefits for pneumoconiosis disabilities arising out of 
coal mine employment). 
147  See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, What Should the Standard of Proof Be in Campus Rape 
Cases?, THE ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/0 
6/campuses-sexual-misconduct/487505/ [https://perma.cc/VP2S-9FM4]. 
148  Naomi M. Mann, Taming Title IX Tensions, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 651 (2018). 
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by existing doctrines. First, there are often multiple producers of the same 
harmful substance operating in the same market.149 Since many toxic exposures 
cause disease only after long latency periods, many plaintiffs will be unable to 
remember which producer’s product they ingested.150 Second, even where 
plaintiffs can, in fact, remember whose products they were exposed to, there may 
be overlapping exposures to similar products. And since diseases like cancer may 
be caused by quite small quantities of a toxic substance, figuring out which 
product injured a plaintiff requires a statistical guess. Finally, most diseases have 
more than one potential cause, with the result that even a definite exposure only 
leads to an increased risk of toxic injury.151 Therefore, the fact that an exposed 
person later suffered a particular disease does not mean that their disease was 
caused by the exposure. Unfortunately for the law, the most that scientific 
inquiry can usually tell us in such cases is that the exposure raised the “relative 
risk” of disease by a given amount.152 
As other scholars have noted, all of these factors make a discontinuous 
burden of proof a particularly poor fit for toxic torts.153 Consider a company that 
knows its drug raises the risk of a particular cancer which is ordinarily found in 
10 out of every 100,000 people, with the result that now 15 out of 100,000 people 
will get it. The preponderance standard will prevent this company for every being 
liable for harm, given that in any individual case, it will be more likely than not 
that the person would have become ill even if they had not taken the drug.154 As 
a result, this company has minimal incentives to warn consumers of the risk or 
find ways to further mitigate it, even when the costs of doing so are small in 
relation to the benefit to society at large. The same result could arise if the disease 
was caused more often, but the market was divided between many producers of 
a single generic drug, none of whom had a market share above 50%. A few courts 
have already begun to consider using continuous burdens to deal with the market 
share cases.155 But since the problems sweep more broadly, it seems that this 
might be an area where the continuous burden might have more appeal as a 
general rule. Indeed, doing so would forestall one problem that will inevitably 
arise if courts try to solve these problems in a piecemeal fashion: what happens 
when plaintiffs present claims that include multiple forms of irreducible 
uncertainty, such as probabilistic proof of disease causation and a fragmented 
market of similar products? Citing to prior precedents where an ad hoc 
adjustment was made to deal with one of these forms of uncertainty in isolation 
 
149  See generally Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk 
Contribution Model, 25 ENV’T L. 549 (1995).  
150  See Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys., 607 P.2d 924, 929–30 (Cal. 1980). 
151  See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 827–28 (Mass. 2008) (collecting cases that 
allowed proportional recovery for an increased risk of disease due to an exposure). 
152  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321–22 n.13 (9th Cir. 1995). 
153  See discussion supra Section II.A and Part III. 
154  Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320 n.13. 
155  See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 827–28; Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937–38; In re “Agent Orange” 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 827–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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will not provide a procedure for addressing them simultaneously in a fair way. 
The continuous burden rule, by contrast, would allow a jury to take each form of 
uncertainty into account (ideally with guidance from expert witnesses or an 
appointed master), in order to reach a decision that optimizes deterrence and 
fairly distributes the risk of errors. 
C. Areas Where Some of the Continuous Burden’s Benefits May Already Be 
Seen in Practice 
Having considered some small steps we might take towards adopting a 
continuous burden, it is also worthwhile to note some ways in which our existing 
system has subtly embraced its underlying logic. Across both civil and criminal 
cases, there are a number of extant doctrines that allow sanctions to vary in 
response to differing levels of confidence in culpability. I have already referred 
to the most obvious such area above, which is the doctrine of market share 
liability in toxic tort cases.156 In the criminal context, the most obvious and 
visible erosion of the discontinuous approach to assigning guilt is the doctrine of 
residual doubt, which applies in the context of capital sentencing. Where 
applicable, the doctrine permits a jury that has convicted a person beyond a 
reasonable doubt to consider any remaining, smaller doubts as a mitigating 
factor in favor of a non-capital sentence.157 This approach sensibly acknowledges 
that a jury might still think there was a significant chance that their verdict might 
be shown to be mistaken, even after convicting a person of a capital crime. Given 
the irrevocability of a death sentence, such concerns provide one very reasonable 
basis for deciding on a sentence of life in prison instead. 
There has been great controversy over the applicability and extent of the 
residual doubt doctrine. The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that criminal 
defendants are constitutionally entitled to have the sentencing judge instruct their 
jury to consider residual doubt as a mitigating factor,158 but it has not forbidden 
the states from including it as part of their own approach to capital sentencing. 
Accordingly, some federal and state courts permit defendants to argue residual 
doubt to a jury, some mandate that it be considered, and some bar defendants 
from raising the issue at all.159 
Given the strong arguments in favor of the continuous burden of proof, it 
seems sensible to embrace the doctrine of residual doubt as a partial 
implementation of it. After all, if we are interested in reducing the magnitude of 
our errors, there seem to be few better places to start than by lowering the 
likelihood that we will execute factually innocent persons. To be sure, adopting 
the doctrine does not dispose of the discontinuity at the initial level of reasonable 
doubt, but it does reduce some of its perverse impact in the higher ranges of jury 
 
156  See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
157  See Fisher, supra note 15, at 838–40. 
158  See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174 (1988). 
159  Fisher, supra note 15, at 840–41 (surveying cases). 
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confidence. Accordingly, it would appear that more states should permit residual 
doubt to be argued, or even go further and require its consideration.160 
Conversely, it has been suggested that whether or not they are instructed or 
encouraged to do so, most juries will, in fact, accord significant weight to 
residual doubt in determining whether a death sentence is appropriate.161 At the 
very least, the arguments above suggest that this reality should not concern us, 
and that we would do more harm than good if we attempted to override this 
natural aspect of jury reasoning with instructions to the contrary. 
We might even imagine building upon the residual doubt doctrine to realize 
similar benefits in non-capital cases.162 Even if the details of guidelines-driven 
sentencing currently make it difficult to realize a pure continuous burden rule, 
they do provide a means by which judges could adjust sentences above the 
reasonable doubt threshold based on varying levels of confidence in guilt. Given 
the Supreme Court’s requirement that any guidelines be advisory in nature,163 a 
sentencing judge might reasonably depart downwards from the guidelines range 
if the jury’s verdict (or a defendant’s plea) seems substantially doubtful, even 
though it rests on legally sufficient evidence. Meanwhile, the judge might use 
their own sense of the probability of guilt to move their discretionary sentence 
towards the bottom of a guidelines range when guilt seemed doubtful, or towards 
the top when it seems nearly certain. Such a thoughtful use of discretion might 
work well to smooth the proof discontinuity a bit, ensuring that we reserve our 
most serious punishments for offenders whose guilt is particularly likely, and 
mitigating the risk of imposing punishment on those more likely to be innocent. 
One other way in which continuous burdens may be partially realized in 
existing practice is in the rising trend towards negotiated resolution of cases. 
Parties who are attempting to settle civil cases or reach plea bargains in criminal 
ones naturally take the strength of anticipated evidence into account when 
formulating their bargaining positions.164 As a result, parties will tend to reach 
agreements that levy larger sentences or payments when the evidence against a 
defendant is strong than they would in cases where the evidence is weaker. This 
variation, in turn, may serve to roughly approximate the valuation that a fact-
 
160  See, e.g., State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55 (Tenn. 2001) (“Tennessee law requires that 
a defendant be allowed to present evidence at a re-sentencing hearing to establish residual 
doubt as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.”). 
161  See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545, 582–83 
(2005). 
162  See id. at 549 (making a pre-Booker argument that the residual doubt doctrine should be 
extended and used by sentencing judges in non-capital cases). 
163  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
164  See Stewart J. Schwab & Michael Heise, Splitting Logs: An Empirical Perspective on 
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 937 (2011) (noting that 
most economic models of settlement “share common conceptual ground insofar as litigants’ 
assessments of their legal exposure inform their bargaining positions”). 
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finder would levy under a continuous burden of proof.165 To be clear, I do not 
mean to suggest that the correspondence is ideal or close to ideal; disparities in 
bargaining power or access to evidence may lead parties to mis-value their cases, 
especially if little discovery has been had at the point when a bargain is reached. 
Moreover, the estimated probability of victory at trial is connected to the 
probability that a party committed an offense, but the two concepts are not 
identical, and in practice they may diverge to some extent.166 And of course, we 
might have other reasons to be concerned about high rates of settlement beyond 
a worry that they unfairly deprive deserving plaintiffs of the full value of 
damages, such as a foregone opportunity for courts to publicly declare what the 
law is or for the public to learn about a defendant’s harmful ongoing conduct.167 
Still, to the extent that a continuous burden provides the benefits I have 
articulated above, we might be less concerned about the trend towards more 
settlements and plea bargains, given that they may result in better deterrence, 
more equal treatment among potential offenders, and less risk of imposing large 
errors on undeserving parties. 
CONCLUSION 
A practice as ancient and familiar as our discontinuous burden of proof can 
easily go unexamined. But when we look closely at our existing burden of proof 
and compare it with potential alternatives, it turns out to have a number of 
significant downsides. The discontinuous liability rule has one major strength, 
which is its tendency to minimize the total value of expected errors in simple 
cases. Unfortunately, it has many weaknesses as well. Compared with a 
 
165  See Spottswood, supra note 59 (showing that, in cases with moderate litigation costs, 
expected settlements will show significant variance due to variations in each party’s level of 
optimism bias and bargaining power, but will on average track the result one might expect 
from using a continuous burden of proof at trial). 
166  See id. Most obviously, parties may mis-forecast their chances of success due to optimistic 
bias. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2498–99 (2004). Less obviously, a given estimated probability of liability is consistent 
with a surprising range of probabilities of victory, depending on how much variance there will 
be among potential decision-makers in their own subjective estimations. Thus, in a case where 
a typical juror would think the defendant is 60% likely to have committed the alleged wrong, 
there might be a near-certain probability of victory if nearly every potential fact-finder would 
agree that the probability was within 5% of that central figure. Conversely, a party might think 
that the estimation was much noisier, with some fact-finders being likely to think the 
appropriate probability was 80% and other fact-finders being likely to think it was 40%. 
Despite having the same central tendency, such a distribution of possible subjective 
estimations would yield a much lower predicted likelihood of success at trial. See Spottswood, 
supra note 59; cf. Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 432–33 (2015) 
(conceptualizing this kind of variation as the noisiness of potential evidence). 
167  See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation 
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1378–87 (1994) (surveying a range of concerns 
regarding the public impacts of settlements); cf. Spottswood, supra note 59 (finding that the 
continuous burden yielded an increase in the rate of settled cases, but that the resulting 
settlements involved a higher rate of expected error overall). 
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continuous burden of proof, it will often provide suboptimal deterrence to 
wrongdoers. It will exacerbate inequalities of outcome due to wealth, status, race, 
and other invidious factors in legal decision-making. It will concentrate all risk 
of error on a single party, and thus produce a greater share of truly distressing 
outcomes, such as death sentences given to factually innocent persons or full 
damages extracted from a company that committed no legal wrong. And it may 
also give parties stronger incentives to spoliate evidence than would exist in a 
continuous regime. 
The best form of burden of proof would strike a reasonable balance between 
these competing concerns. As I outlined above, the logistic burden of proof has 
a strong claim to strike the best balance in civil cases. Such a burden of proof 
can minimize the risk of large errors by optimally spreading the risk of error 
across both parties. It can strike a trade-off between the otherwise hard-to-
reconcile goals of deterring wrongdoing and minimizing the total quantity of 
expected error. And it can go a long way towards reducing the impacts of unfair 
biases and the incentive to hide or destroy important evidence. 
Of course, the burdens of history and tradition loom large over those who 
would seek to optimize our trial processes in novel ways. However, there are 
some ways in which we might begin to experiment with explicitly continuous 
burdens of proof. At the same time, I have sought to illustrate that our system, in 
action, may assign liability and punishment in ways that are closer to the 
continuous ideal than our officially discontinuous rule. The doctrine of residual 
doubt, the flexibility of judicial sentencing, the possibility of jury compromise, 
and the regular resort to settlements and plea bargains provide many ways in 
which doubts about guilt or liability can reduce the assessed level of punishment 
for a potential wrongdoer. To the extent that readers are convinced by the 
normative claims I have urged above, these practices may be more valuable than 
might otherwise be supposed. Either way, I hope that my observations may 
stimulate further discussion on the optimal design of burdens of proof. 
